Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Animal Welfare

Animal Welfare Act Does Not Provide a Private Cause of Action

Walt McCarter
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Zimmerman v. Wolff, No. 08-3811, 2008 WL 5264911 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2008), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff's claims brought under the Animal Welfare Act, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause because the Animal Welfare Act does not create a private cause of action, and because the constitutional claims were not brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as required for state actors.

Background

The Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement denied the plaintiff's application for a state dog kennel license because of his convictions under the Pennsylvania Cruelty to Animals Law, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5511(c)(1), and for failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Dog Law. Id. at *1. Plaintiff then brought this action against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, seeking to enjoin the agency from seizing his dogs and preventing him from operating his kennel under his federal kennel license. Id. He simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order, and the court declined to rule those motions pending resolution of a separate action concerning the validity of the plaintiff's license. Id. The trial court in that action ultimately granted the defendant's petition for an injunction enjoining the plaintiff from operating a dog kennel within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania without a valid kennel license, and then the district court in this case considered and ruled on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order and the defendant's unanswered motion to dismiss. Id.

Arguments

The plaintiff asserted claims pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2149, the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, requesting an injunction to prevent the defendant from seizing his dogs and from stopping him from operating his dog kennel under his federal license. Id. at *3.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claims should fail because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims because the AWA does not provide a private right of action, and because the plaintiff did not bring his Commerce Clause claim against the defendant, a state actor, under § 1983 as required, and alternatively because he did not adequately state a cause of action. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

The court began by holding that the AWA does not provide a private cause of action, and therefore it dismissed the plaintiff's AWA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *4. The court also explained that to bring a federal constitutional claim against a state actor, a plaintiff must bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the plaintiff had not done; therefore, the court denied his motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The court then had to consider whether to allow the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Id. In doing so, the court reasoned that the denial of a kennel license was not a substantial burden upon interstate commerce because the Commerce Clause is not designed to protect individuals, and moreover, the alleged burden upon the plaintiff was not clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits of the Pennsylvania Dog Law. Id. at 6. The court concluded that plaintiff would have been unable to state a claim under the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at *6. The court further found no conflict, and thus no grounds for federal preemption, between the AWA and the Pennsylvania Dog Law. Id. at *7. In sum, because the plaintiff's claim would fail on the merits even if brought under the correct provision, the court concluded that it would be futile for the plaintiff to amend his complaint and therefore denied leave to amend. Id.

The case was decided on December 18, 2008.