Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Animal Feeding Operations

Separation Requirement Held Applicable Only to Animal
Feeding Operations, Not to Commercial Feedlots

Eric H. Foy
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Woodruff v. Board of Commissioners for Hand County, 741 N.W.2d 746 (S.D. 2007), the Supreme Court of South Dakota denied Woodruff's writ of mandamus petition requiring the county to enforce a zoning ordinance and prohibit the construction of a hog operation near Woodruff's residence. The court, affirming the decision of the circuit court, held that the zoning ordinance did not require a two-mile separation between the proposed hog facility and the residence at issue.

Background

Property owners obtained a building permit to construct a hog facility capable of holding 960 animal units. Id. at 747. Woodruff, a neighboring resident living 1.8 miles from proposed facility, alleged that the proposed hog facility would violate a county ordinance that required a two-mile distance between an animal waste facility and an occupied residence. Id. The county denied the request. In response, Woodruff sought a writ of mandamus from the circuit court to require the county to enforce the zoning ordinance. Id. The circuit court denied relief, and Woodruff appealed. Id.

Arguments

The arguments asserted by both sides of the lawsuit were rooted in the construction and language of the ordinance. Woodruff argued that the separation requirement applied to commercial feedlots, like property owner's proposed facility, because the term "commercial feedlot" was included in the heading of the zoning ordinance, and it followed that the listed requirements would apply to the titled facilities. Id. at 748.

The property owners alleged that the separation agreement only applied to animal feeding operations. Id. Because the property owners planned on using the facility for only 960 animal units, they claimed the facility was not an animal feeding operation (over 1000 animal units) but rather a commercial feedlot. Id. The property owners argued that if their facility was defined as a commercial feedlot, then the separation agreement did not apply. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

The court quickly dismissed Woodruff's argument that the title of the ordinance controls its substance. Id. The ordinance did not specifically refer to either animal feeding operations or commercial feedlots; rather, it applied the separation agreement to animal waste facilities. Id. Because the ordinance required only animal feeding operations to have animal waste facilities, the court read the separation requirement language to apply exclusively to animal feeding operations and not commercial feedlots. Id. The court stated that the holding could create a potential anomalous result because only animal feeding operations, which must be at least two miles from occupied residences, were required to have an animal waste facility and not commercial feedlots, which are not subject to the separation requirement. Id. at 749. Nonetheless, the court stated that they were bound by the language of the ordinance. Id.

The case was decided on October 31, 2007.