Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Environmental Law

Legislative Act Is Void for Vagueness if Its Prohibitions
Are Not Clearly Defined

Eric H. Foy
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In United States v. Wabash Valley Service Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 835 (S.D. Ill. 2006), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted the defendants' motion to dismiss charges brought against them by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA charged the defendants with violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) for failing to follow labeling provisions for registered use pesticides. Although the defendants could not facially challenge the FIFRA labeling provision, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss because it held that the labeling provision was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendants.

Background

On May 8, 2000, defendant Noah Horton, a Wabash Valley Service Company employee, spread two restricted-use pesticides on an Illinois farm. Id. at 837. A neighbor, worried that the pesticides would drift onto her person and property, called the authorities when she saw Horton spreading the pesticides. Id. The pesticides used by Horton contained the chemical Atrazine, which the EPA had classified as a registered-use pesticide because of its toxicity to marine life. Id. at 838. The EPA contended that Horton applied the pesticides illegally because he spread the pesticides during windy conditions, and therefore he failed to comply with the prohibitions on pesticides' labels and violated FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G). Id.

Arguments

The defendants argued that 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them and also void on its face. Id. They argued that the vagueness inquiry should be viewed from "the perspective of one with specialized knowledge in the industry." Id. at 842.

The government argued that the question of vagueness should be evaluated according to a reasonable person standard. Id. at 842-43.

Analysis and Holdings

It is "unlawful for any person . . . to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling." Id. at 838 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G)). Because the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit previously held that "non-First Amendment-implicating statutes [were] not subject to facial attack," the court only examined whether 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendants, and it dispensed with the defendants' facial attack. Id. at 839. The labels on the two pesticides were identical, and read, in pertinent part, "Do not apply this product in a way that will contact workers or other persons, either directly or through drift." Id. at 843. Despite both parties' attempts to steer the court's focus toward other issues, the court stated that the key issue in this case was "whether the provisions incorporated into the statute apprise[d] an applicator of what conduct [would] subject him to sanctions." Id. Ultimately, the court held that the provision was unconstitutionally vague because its prohibitions were not adequately defined and did not provide applicators with "reasonable notice of what conduct it proscribe[d]." Id. at 846. The court also reached the identical conclusion regarding the second and third labeling provisions disputed before the court. Id. at 847, 851. For these reasons, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id.

The case was decided on March 16, 2006.