Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Landowner Liability

Court Refuses Res Ipsa Loquitor Instruction; Plaintiff Fails to Show
Defendant Had Exclusive Control of Water Table

Eric H. Foy
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Van Alstyne v. Carter, No. C056440, 2009 WL 990756 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2009), the California Court of Appeals, Third District affirmed in part and vacated in part the ruling of the trial court. The plaintiff sued his neighbors alleging that water from their rice fields caused the water table under his land to rise and damage his alfalfa crop. The court granted the defendants' motion for nonsuit for the fraud, public nuisance, strict liability, and intentional tort claims, and the jury returned a verdict against the plaintiff's remaining causes of action, including private nuisance, negligence, breach of contract, and trespass. In affirming, the court held that the trial court had correctly instructed the jury and that the plaintiff had no justification for refusing to pay sanctions.

Background

In 2003, the plaintiff and defendants farmed on adjacent parcels of land. Id. at *1. On June 5, 2003, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendants notifying them that a common water table had risen after the defendants flooded their rice fields. Id. On May 31, 2004, the plaintiff wrote another letter to the defendants alleging that the water table level had risen higher than the levels reached in previous growing seasons, and opined that his alfalfa would drown if the water level remained in such a condition. Id. Shortly thereafter, the defendants visited the plaintiff and assured the plaintiff that they would use their best efforts to reduce rice watering. Id. On July 4, 2004, the plaintiff again notified the defendants of the water problem and said that the moisture was beginning to kill his alfalfa. Id. After sending a number of additional letters to the defendants about the water problem, the plaintiff brought the instant suit. Id. One defendant filed motions to compel the plaintiff and his mother to provide further responses, and the trial court granted the motion to compel and awarded sanctions against them. Id. at *12.

Arguments

The plaintiff contended that the trial court: erred in granting a nonsuit on his fraud cause of action; abused its discretion in excluding evidence that defendants pumped contaminated wastewater onto his rice field; erred in granting defendants' motion for nonsuit as to his strict liability cause of action; erred in granting the defendants' motion for nonsuit as to the intentional trespass cause of action; erred in its rulings on various discovery orders; erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as to his trespass and negligence causes of action; and improperly awarded sanctions because "[t]here was no jurisdiction to convene the [continued] deposition." Id. at *19.

Analysis and Holdings

The plaintiff asserted that he could refuse to comply with a court order to pay sanctions by challenging them on a jurisdictional basis. Id. In making this assertion, the plaintiff relied on In re Marriage of Niklas, 211 Cal. App. 3d 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). Id. In Niklas, the court held that "[a] person may refuse to comply with a court order and raise as a defense to the imposition of sanctions that the order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and therefore invalid, but may not assert as a defense that the order merely was erroneous." Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Niklas, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 35). In the instant case, the plaintiff did not argue that the order to respond to deposition questions was beyond the court's jurisdiction; rather, he argued that "there was no jurisdiction to convene the continued deposition given the pendency of his motion for reconsideration of the court's June 19, 2006, order." Id. at *20. For this reason, the court held that Niklas did not provide a basis for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order to pay sanctions. Id.

The court also addressed the plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as to his trespass and negligence causes of action. Id. at *25. The trial court decided that "res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the present case and refused the instruction, explaining that '[a] high water table . . . certainly [could not] be said in all instances to be of a kind which ordinarily [did] not occur in the absence of someone's negligence . . . .'" Id. at *26. The instant court agreed, holding that "no reasonable juror could conclude that the [defendants] were in exclusive control of the water table under the [plaintiff's] parcel during the relevant time periods." Id. For this reason, the court held that "the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Id.

The plaintiff also argued that the court erred in "refusing to instruct the jury 'that failing to abate the [water saturated] condition after reasonable notice was a basis for [nuisance] liability.'" Id. at *26. In support, he cited case law standing for the proposition that nuisance liability could arise from merely negligent conduct even when there was no intent to interfere with the plaintiff, "but merely a failure to take precautions against a risk apparent to a reasonable man." Id. (quoting Coates v. Chinn, 51 Cal. 2d 304, 307 (1958)). In the case at bar, the court instructed the jury that it "was free to find in [the plaintiff's] favor based on conduct that was merely negligent." Id. The instant court held that the trial court was not required to do anything more. Id. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. Id. at *30.

The case was decided on April 14, 2009.