Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Agritourism

New Laws Regulating Alternative Livestock Ranches Upheld

Walt McCarter
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of several state and federal constitutional claims against the state of Montana and the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks concerning a newly enacted law regulating "alternative livestock" ranches.

Background

Owners of alternative livestock ranches brought this action against the state of Montana and the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (DFWP), challenging the constitutionality of a ballot initiative that imposed restrictions on their ranching practices. Id. at 1053. The ranchers, who raised elk, deer, bighorn sheep, mountain goats, and bison, earned their income primarily from "fee shooting," a practice by which members of the public paid to shoot a pre-selected animal on the ranch under the supervision of a guide. Id. at 1053-54. Opponents of fee shooting collected enough signatures to qualify their proposal for the November 2000 statewide ballot, which passed and became effective immediately. Id. at 1054. The proposal prohibited operating an alternative livestock ranch without a license obtained prior to November 7, 2000, and prohibited the issuance of new licenses. Id. It also prohibited the transfer of a license for a specific facility, and it prohibited licensees from charging fees for the shooting of their livestock. Id. Existing licensees were, however, permitted to "acquire, breed, grow, keep, pursue, handle, harvest, use, sell, or dispose of the alternative livestock and their progeny in any quantity and at any time of year." Id. Several ranchers brought actions against the state and the DFWP in federal and state courts, and they subsequently moved to stay their federal action pursuant to the Pullman abstention doctrine, pending resolution of their state court suits. Id. at 1054-55. The district court denied the motion to stay and ultimately dismissed their claims, and the ranchers appealed. Id. at 1055.

Arguments

The appellants argued that the district court should have abstained under the Pullman abstention doctrine. Id. They further argued that the legislation constituted a governmental taking, that it was impermissibly retroactive, that it was "irrational and arbitrary," and that it placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1057-59.

Analysis and Holdings

The court explained that the Pullman doctrine is an equitable doctrine that allows federal courts to refrain from deciding sensitive federal constitutional questions when state law issues may moot or narrow the constitutional questions, and abstention is appropriate when: "(1) the federal plaintiff's complaint requires resolution of a sensitive question of federal constitutional law; (2) the constitutional question could be mooted or narrowed by a definitive ruling on the state law issues; and (3) the possibly determinative issue of state law is unclear." Id. at 1055. The court held that the third element had not been satisfied because when the district court denied the motion to stay, the state trial courts had already ruled adversely on most of the appellants' state law claims. Id. The court further held that certain of the appellants' claims were precluded by the doctrine of res judicata because they had already been dismissed by other state trial courts. Id. at 1056. As for the remaining claim, the court held that the appellants had failed to prove that there had been a governmental taking, and that the state's abolition of formerly legal fee shooting practices was not impermissibly retroactive, noting that "a state may outlaw a formerly legal business even if it causes hardship to those who relied on the earlier law." Id. at 1057-58.

The court then rejected the appellants' substantive due process claim, finding that the state had offered sufficient justification that that implicated issues of safety, health, and welfare that were within the state's legitimate police power, and that the law was not arbitrary or pretextual. Id. at 1059. Considering the appellants' Commerce Clause claim, the court explained that when a state statute affects interstate commerce, courts assess whether the statute "regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest" and whether "its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental." Id. The court concluded that a rational legislator could have found that the law served a legitimate public interest, and there had been no allegation that the law imposed more than incidental burdens on interstate commerce, and therefore affirmed dismissal of that claim as well. Id. Lastly, the court affirmed dismissal of the appellants' claims against the director of the DFWP in his individual capacity because they had failed to show that any of their federal constitutional rights had been violated. Id. at 1060.

The case was decided on June 13, 2005.