Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Animal Feeding Operations

Decree Enforcing a Mediated Settlement of a
Nuisance Action is Affirmed

Elizabeth Smith McKinney
National AgLaw Center Graduate Assistant

Summary of Decision

In Sierra Club v. Wayne Weber, L.L.C., 689 N.W.2d 696 (Iowa 2004), the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's decree that resolved the disputed terms of a mediated settlement agreement of a nuisance action. See id. at 698, 705. The court also upheld the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to a livestock producer regarding whether he was required to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for the livestock confinement facilities. See id. at 705.

Background

The Sierra Club brought a nuisance action against defendant Wayne Weber, a livestock producer. See id. at 698. Hawkeye Fly Fishing Association intervened and joined in the Sierra Club's claims for relief. See id. Mediation was pursued to resolve the matter, and the parties agreed to incorporate the substance of their agreement into a consent decree. See id. at 698-99. Both parties entered contrasting proposed decrees, and the district court determined that the proposed decree submitted by the plaintiff and intervenor represented the mediated agreement of the parties. See id. at 699. The district court further granted partial summary judgment to the defendant regarding the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant was required to have a NPDES permit for the livestock confinement facilities regardless of a finding by the Iowa Department of Natural Resources that a NPDES permit was not required. See id. at 698.

Arguments

The defendant had three main arguments. See id. First, he contended that he did not agree to the material terms of the agreement as manifested in the decree. See id. at 702. At the heart of the defendant's objection was the requirement for "deep-Rooted prairie grass cover for the buffer areas." Id. The district court's decree called for the use of prairie grass on particular parts of the buffer areas, and it allowed for Weber to use bromegrass on the areas farthest removed from as nearby creek. See id. at 699-700, 702. Second, the defendant argued that he did not agree to the manure spreading restrictions or the harvesting forage restrictions as summarized in the district court's decree. See id. at 703. He also contended that the manure spreading restrictions only applied to the confinement facilities addressed in the litigation and not to other sources of manure. See id. at 704. Lastly, the defendant asserted that paragraph 4 of the decree included a provision addressing adjacent land, which unduly burdened landowners who were not a party to the mediated agreement. See id.

Sierra Club and Hawkeye appealed the partial summary judgment granted to Weber concerning their claim that Weber's operation required a NPDES permit. See id.

Analysis and Holding(s)

The court applied "general principles of contract law" as determined by Iowa state law to the interpretation of the settlement agreement. Id. at 702. To determine the intent of the parties and the terms of the agreement, the court listened to the tape-recorded conclusion of the mediation session, which "expressly provided that a 'form of plant that is deep-rooted of a prairie variety which will maximize soil retention and water infiltration' must be employed." Id.

The court noted that no mention was made of the partial bromegrass allowance in the tape recording and as such, there was no agreement from the defendant to this compromise. See id. at 703. Because the result was favorable to the defendant and not challenged by Sierra Club and Hawkeye, the court allowed this provision to stand. See id. As to the harvesting forage requirement, the court reasoned that the defendant's objection was based on his position that he should be able to plant the whole buffer area in bromegrass, but the record indicated that he could hay the bromegrass area with a six-inch limitation. See id. The prairie grass, which is not "suitable for forage", could only be cut if it did not disturb "the effectiveness of the buffer strip for purposes of preventing runoff and erosion." Id. The court found the harvesting provision to be consistent with the mediated agreement. See id.

The court inferred a prohibition on the spreading of manure on the buffer strip from The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides that "'[t]erms may be supplied by factual implication.'" Id. at 704 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 cmt. a (1979)). It was reasoned that this prohibition and the restrictions against grazing were principles for the trial court's action. See id. In addressing the manure source issue, the court held that the spreading of any manure would be "inconsistent with the purpose of the settlement agreement" and there was no language in the tape recording to allow interpretation to the contrary. Id.

In the defendant's final argument, the court found that an adjacent landowner would only be burdened if that landowner allowed the buffer strips; otherwise, the burden was on the defendant, as outlined in the decree. See id.

The court refused to address the appeal from Sierra Club and Hawkeye concerning the NPDES requirement because the district court's decree "constitute(d) a complete and final settlement of all claims which were asserted, or could have been asserted," and the "unambiguous language (of the district court's decree) applies to all claims in the litigation." Id. at 705. All respects of the district court's decree were affirmed. See id.

The case was decided on December 3, 2004; this summary was posted Mar. 21, 2005.