Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Landowner Liability

Crop Dusting Still Considered an "Inherently Dangerous" Activity

Walt McCarter
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Pride of San Juan, Inc. v. Pratt, 212 P.3d 29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that although modern technology had decreased the risks associated with crop dusting, it was still an inherently dangerous activity such that an employer could be held vicariously liable for a crop dusting company's negligence.

Background

A crop dusting company hired by a broccoli farmer to spray his fields negligently contaminated his neighbor's fields in the process. Id. The neighbor obtained a judgment against the crop dusting company, and sought to hold the farmer who hired it vicariously liable as well. Id. The trial court denied the defendant-farmer's motion for summary judgment, relying on case precedent from 1933 in which the Arizona Supreme Court had held that because crop dusting was an inherently dangerous activity, a person who hires another for such services is vicariously liable for resulting negligence. Id. The defendant appealed. Id.

Arguments

The defendant argued that crop dusting was no longer an inherently dangerous activity due to technological advances in the aerial application of pesticides, so he should not be held vicariously liable for the plaintiff's damages. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

An employer is not ordinarily liable for the negligent acts of independent contractors, but an exception to that rule applies when an independent contractor is hired to perform an "inherently dangerous" activity. Id. at *2. The issue before the court was whether crop dusting still constituted an "inherently dangerous" activity, as the Arizona Supreme Court had determined in 1933. Id. The court explained that "an activity is considered inherently dangerous based on two factors: (1) if the risk of harm cannot be eliminated through the exercise of reasonable care; and (2) if the risk is to the person, land or chattels of another," and added that "if the risk can be recognized in advance, it is sufficient if the risk of harm is either inherent in its nature, or is a risk normally expected in doing the task." Id. at *3. The court conceded that the inherent risks associated with crop dusting (such as contaminating adjoining premises) had been alleviated somewhat by modern technology, but noted that those risks still existed and could not be completely eliminated through reasonable care. Id. at *3-4. The court therefore held that crop dusting was an "inherently dangerous" activity, and affirmed the lower court's ruling. Id. at *5.

The case was decided on January 29, 2009.