Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Animal Welfare

Court Finds Dog Law Statute Ambiguous Regarding Shooting One's Own Pet

Walt McCarter
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Pennsylvania v. Kneller, --- A.2d ---, 2009 WL 215322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009), the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the Pennsylvania Dog Law statutes were ambiguous as to whether an owner may destroy his or her dog or cat by shooting it, and therefore held that no conviction under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5511(a)(2.1)(i) could stand where an owner shot his or her own pet.

Background

A dog owner provided the pet's co-owner with a gun and ordered him to kill the dog because it had bitten her child. Id. at *1. She was subsequently convicted of criminal conspiracy to commit cruelty to animals under the "Dog Law," 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5511(a)(2.1)(i), and appealed. Id.

Arguments

The defendant argued that the trial court misconstrued the Dog Law by eliminating the relevant defense that an owner may destroy his or her dog by shooting it. Id.

The Commonwealth argued that the defense asserted by the defendant was only applicable when the pet is injured or unfit for a useful purpose, which was not the case. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

The court summarized the issue as "whether it is permissible for a dog owner to dispose of his or her dog that is not injured or unfit for use, by means of a firearm." Id. The court noted that "the entire Dog Law is ambiguous as to whether a dog owner can kill his dog by means of a firearm," and explained that "where ambiguity exists in the language of a penal statute, it should be interpreted in a light most favorable to the criminally accused." Id. The court examined 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5511(a)(2.1)(i), which makes it a crime to willfully and maliciously kill, maim, mutilate, torture or disfigure a dog or cat. Id. at *2. However, the court acknowledged that subsection (iii) of the statute provided that such conduct "is not malicious if it is accomplished in accordance with . . . the Animal Destruction Method Authorization Law." Id. That act, 3 P.S. § 328.2(a), allows an owner to kill a pet "by the administration of an overdose of a barbiturate," while subsection (b) states that "[n]othing in this act shall prevent a person or humane society organization from destroying a pet animal by means of firearms." Id. The court, reading the two statutes together, concluded that the owner can destroy a pet by means of an overdose of barbiturates or "by means of firearms." Id. However, the Commonwealth asserted that the act was not controlling in this case because it addressed the way humane societies can dispose of animals, and humane societies are authorized to destroy animals regardless of whether they are injured or disabled. Id. at *3. The court rejected that argument, stating that "[i]f it is read to mean that this can only be done to destroy sick or injured animals, then every humane society that routinely kills unwanted animals is constantly violating the law." Id. Because the statute was subject to various interpretations and was therefore ambiguous, the court, applying the rule of lenity, held that "no criminal conviction [under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5511(a)(2.1)(i)] can stand if an owner shoots his or her dog or cat," and therefore reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. at *2, *4.

The concurrence opined that the statutes were not ambiguous in this situation because "the Dog Law specifically provides that a licensed dog may be killed when the animal is 'caught in the act' of attacking a human being," which applied to the defendant because she had witnessed the dog attacking her child. Id. at *5. The dissent found that the dog had clearly not been "killed in accordance with the Animal Destruction Method Authorization Law," and believed that the conviction should be affirmed. Id. at *7-8.

The case was decided on January 30, 2009.