Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Animal Welfare

New Jersey Supreme Court Invalidates
Certain Animal Welfare Regulations

Walt McCarter
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In New Jersey Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. New Jersey Department of Agriculture, 955 A.2d 886 (N.J. 2008) the New Jersey Supreme Court held that certain animal welfare regulations adopted by the New Jersey Department of Agriculture failed to comply with legislative intent that the regulations be "humane," and it remanded those regulations for further consideration.

Background

In 1996, New Jersey enacted new legislation giving the state's Department of Agriculture certain authority over the welfare of domestic livestock, and directed the Department to create regulations for raising, keeping, and marketing farm animals. Id. at 888. The legislation specified that the guiding principle to be used to create the standards was whether treatment of the animals was "humane," and ordered the Department to consult with the New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station in developing the regulations. Id. at 890-91. The New Jersey Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NJSPCA), however, remained responsible for enforcement of the new regulations. Id. at 891. The Department developed the proposed regulations after consulting with the Experiment Station, as well as with other academicians, the NJSPCA, veterinarians, Department staff, extension agents, producers, and allied industries. Id.

The Department offered its proposed regulations for public comment in 2003, and after considering the comments and testimony, it amended certain proposed regulations and formally codified the regulations in June 2004. Id. The Department adopted another amendment in October 2006 relating to regulations designed to limit induced molting procedures and to ban full feed-removal forced molting in poultry operations. Id. at 892. The NJSPCA, along with several other animal welfare entities, challenged the Department's adopted regulations through an appeal in the Appellate Division, claiming that the Department had failed to comply with the Legislature's intent of "humane" treatment. Id. at 893. The Appellate Division dismissed the Petitioners' challenges, and the NJSPCA brought this action against the Department of Agriculture. Id. at 893-94.

Arguments

The NJSPCA argued that the regulations created by the Department of Agriculture: (1) failed in general to comply with the mandate of the Legislature to create standards that are "humane," either objectively or as tested against the definition that the Department itself adopted; (2) created an impermissibly broad and vague category of permitted practices by referring to "routine husbandry practices" as generally acceptable; (3) failed to create an adequate regulatory scheme by utilizing undefined or ill-defined terms that cannot serve as objectively enforceable standards; and (4) embraced a variety of specific practices that were either objectively inhumane or supported by inadequate scientific evidence as to their usefulness, or that failed to meet any accepted definition of the term "humane." Id. at 893.

The Department argued that the regulations were consistent with both the intent and the spirit of the statute and supported by ample scientific evidence, defended its selection of "routine husbandry practices" as an appropriate criterion for its safe harbor exemption, argued that the regulations established objectively enforceable standards, and argued that none of the specific practices that the Petitioners challenged were in fact inhumane. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

The court found that the regulations were not arbitrary or capricious as a whole, because the Department had developed an extensive record from a wide range of sources in its rulemaking procedure, including making the proposed regulations available for public comment, and thus declined to invalidate the entirety of the regulations. Id. at 889-903. However, the court found that the Department's safe harbor exemption from animal cruelty penalties for "routine husbandry practices" failed to comply with the statutory intent that practices involving domestic livestock be "humane," because although the Department had defined such practices as those taught by veterinary schools, land grant colleges, and agricultural extension agents, it had failed to determine whether those practices were actually considered "humane" treatment rather than just economically productive. Id. at 903-04. The court also determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a safe harbor exemption for tail docking of dairy cattle, and that although there was sufficient evidence to permit a safe harbor exemption for castration, de-beaking, and toe-trimming, the regulations concerning those practices lacked objective standards of "knowledge" required to "minimize pain." Id. at 908-13. Lastly, the court determined that a safe harbor for crating and tethering veal calves and swine was not arbitrary and capricious because scientific data showed that it benefited the animals, and that a safe harbor for transporting sick or downed animals was not arbitrary and capricious because federal regulations prohibited downed animals from entering the food supply and state regulations already required sick or downed animals to be treated humanely. Id. at 914-16.

The case was decided on July 30, 2008; this summary was posted February 5, 2009.