Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Animal Feeding Operations

Indiana's Right to Farm Act Is Not an Unconstitutional Taking

L. Paul Goeringer
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that Indiana's Right to Farm Act was not an unconstitutional takings. The court further found that the plaintiffs brought their action eighteen months after the dairy had started operations, which was not within one year as required by the statute, and presented no evidence that the dairy was negligently operated. The plaintiffs also failed to preserve for appeal arguments that the dairy had undergone a significant change in operation after its first year and that it was a nuisance for the locality when it was started. Finally, the plaintiffs presented no evidence to support their trespass claim, criminal mischief claim, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court affirmed the granting of summary judgment by the trial court.

Background

In 1998, the plaintiffs purchased rural property and constructed a home on the property. Id. at 1255. At that time, the surrounding properties were in agricultural use, with many farms containing livestock. Id.

In 2001, the defendants bought an operational hog farm with the intent of turning the property into a dairy. Id. After construction of new barns, the defendants' dairy began operation on July 24, 2002. Id. The dairy was regulated by the Indiana Department of Environmental Regulation (IDEM), and at times was allegedly in violation of the department's regulations, although none of the alleged violations were proven. Id.

On the north border of the plaintiffs' property, the defendants owned farmland that they regularly planted with crops. Id. A grass strip that ran along the boundary was claimed by the plaintiffs to be on their property. Id. Because of these allegations, the defendants hired a licensed surveyor to determine the boundary. Id. The surveyor determined that the southern half was owned by the plaintiffs and the northern half owned by the defendants. Id. Although the plaintiffs did not agree with the survey, they never conducted their own survey. Id. at 1255-56.

In December 2003, the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants seeking to enjoin them from spreading effluent on their neighboring property and for "nuisance, negligence, trespass, criminal mischief, and intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 1256. In April 2008, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. The trial court held that the Indiana Right to Farm Act was constitutional as applied in this case, that it barred the nuisance claims, and that no material issues of fact existed regarding the trespass, criminal mischief, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Id. The plaintiffs filed this appeal. Id.

Arguments

The plaintiff argued Indiana's Right to Farm Act was an unconstitutional taking and cited precedent from other states to guide the court. Id. at 1257-59. The plaintiffs also argued that the dairy's operation fell within the three exceptions to the one-year statute of limitations found in the Act. Id. at 1259-62. Claiming ownership over the grass strip boundary, the plaintiffs also argued that the defendants had trespassed and committed criminal mischief by entering the grass strip without the plaintiffs' permission. Id. at 1262-64. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the dairy was operated in a way that inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiffs. Id. at 1264-65.

Analysis and Holdings

After examining other states' decisions regarding the constitutionality of similar right to farm laws, the court found that Indiana's version was not an unconstitutional taking. Id. at 1259. The Iowa Supreme Court had considered its right to farm law, which was passed in 1895, and it found "that the right to maintain a nuisance is an easement" and that "easements are property interests subject to the just compensation requirements of both the federal and Iowa constitutions . . . ." Id. The Iowa court found that the nuisance immunity provided in Iowa's law violated both state and federal constitutions and was an uncompensated taking of private property for a public purpose. Id.

Next the court turned to prior decisions in Idaho and Texas that upheld the constitutionality of their states' laws. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the holding of the Iowa Supreme Court, finding "no direct authority in Idaho holding that the right to maintain a nuisance is an easement." Id. The Idaho court concluded Idaho's Right to Farm law was not an unconstitutional taking. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals also rejected claims that the Texas Right to Farm law was an unconstitutional taking. Id. at 1258-59. The court in the instant case concluded, "we have found nothing to suggest that Indiana has adopted the seemingly unique Iowa holding that the right to maintain a nuisance is an easement . . . ." Id. at 1259. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument to extend the Iowa court's holding to Indiana, and turned to the application of the Act in the instant case. Id.

The Act contained a one year statute of limitations, beginning at the time of operation of the farm, with some exceptions. Id. at 1257. The plaintiffs brought their action eighteen months after the dairy began operation, which was not within the required one year. Id. at 1259. The court then looked to see whether the actions fell within one of the three exceptions to the one-year statute of limitations. Id. The court found,

the Act applies and bars the Lindseys' nuisance suit unless there has been a significant change in the type of operation, the operation would have been a nuisance at the time the operation began in its current locality, or the nuisance results from the negligent operation of the agricultural operation.
Id.

As for the first and second exceptions, the court found that the plaintiffs never alleged before the trial court that there had been a significant change in operation or that the dairy would have been a nuisance when it began its operation in that locality. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs had waived these claims on appeal, and then turned to the third exception. Id. at 1259-60.

The plaintiff argued that the dairy was negligently operated because of violations of the IDEM's regulations. Id. at 1260. The court stated,

assuming for the purpose of summary judgment that DeGroot Dairy committed the statutory violations alleged in the preliminary injunction and that DeGroot Dairy owed a statutory duty to the Lindseys', the statutory violations may be considered as evidence of negligence on behalf of DeGroot Dairy with respect to the Lindseys' claims if DeGroot Dairys' statutory violations were the proximate cause of the Lindseys' claimed injury.
Id.

The injunctions were granted for manure spills and runoff that occurred one mile from the plaintiffs' property and to protect against possible groundwater contamination. Id. at 1260-61. The court found the plaintiffs presented no evidence that these violations were the proximate cause of their claimed injuries, and that they failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1261. Regarding the testimony of the plaintiffs about alleged violations in 2002 that interfered with their use and enjoyment of their property, the court found the plaintiffs had presented no evidence of loss of use and enjoyment of their property because of the negligent operation of the dairy. Id. at 1261-62. The court affirmed the decision that the plaintiffs' nuisance claims were barred. Id. at 1262.

Having addressed the challenges under the Right to Farm Act, the court turned to the plaintiffs' other claims. The plaintiffs argued that the dispute over ownership of the grass strip was sufficient to defend against a motion for summary judgment. Id. The defendants pointed to their survey of the grass strip, which found that the defendants owned the north half of the grass strip and the plaintiffs owned the southern half. Id. at 1262-63. The court found that

[t]he alleged trespass occurred on the northern half of the grass strip. The Lindseys' designated no evidence disputing the [surveyor's] affidavit but merely stated in their response brief that they believe[d] that the DeGroots' deliberately used farm machinery on their property knowing it would interfere with their use and enjoyment of the land. The Lindseys' belief, however, does not constitute the type of factual showing necessary to avoid summary judgment.
Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

The court upheld the trial court's granting summary judgment for the defendant on the issue of trespass. Id.

The plaintiffs also claimed they were entitled to damages for criminal mischief because of "tractor ruts, manure spillage, and flies left on their property by" the defendants. Id. First, the court found that the plaintiffs had not offered "any evidence establishing that DeGroot Dairy recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally 'left' any flies on the Lindseys' property." Id. The court also found that the plaintiffs had offered no evidence that the defendants had "recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damaged or defaced their [the plaintiffs'] property, and therefore no issue of material fact remain[ed]." Id. at 1264. The court upheld the granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on this issue. Id.

Finally, on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found no evidence of outrageous behavior by the defendants. Id. at 1265. Looking at prior Indiana decisions, the court stated, "considering the facts in the light most favorable to the Lindseys as the non-moving parties, we can conclude as a matter of law that DeGroot Dairys' actions do not constitute 'outrageous' behavior as contemplated by the narrow definition adopted from the Restatement." Id. at 1264. The court concluded, "[m]oreover, there is also nothing in the record which would support a reasonable inference that DeGroot Dairy intended to cause emotional distress to the Lindseys by its behavior." Id. at 1265. The court affirmed the decision of the trial court in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id.

The case was decided on January 12, 2009.