Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Agritourism

Equine Activity Act Precludes Liability for Injuries Sustained
as a Result of Inherent Risks

Walt McCarter
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Lee v. Loftin, 277 S.W.3d 519, 2009 WL 224680 (Tex. App. 2009), the Texas Court of Appeals, Tyler Division, held that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether a defendant had acted negligently or irresponsibly in conducting a trail ride, therefore precluding summary judgment on the issue of liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the ride.

Background

The plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained while riding one of the defendant's horses on a trail ride with the defendant. Id. at *1. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the Equine Activity Act, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 87.001-.005, precluded liability for the injuries, and the plaintiffs appealed. Id.

Arguments

The defendant argued that the claim was barred by the Equine Activity Act. Id.

The plaintiff argued that the claim was not barred because of § 87.004, which provides an exception to the Act when a person acts negligently in conducting or participating in the equine activity. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

The Equine Activity Act precludes liability for "property damage or damages arising from the personal injury or death of a participant in an equine activity or livestock show if the property damage, injury, or death results from the dangers or conditions that are an inherent risk of an equine activity," and enumerates such inherent risks as follows:

(1) the propensity of an equine or livestock animal to behave in ways that may result in personal injury or death to a person on or around it;
(2) the unpredictability of an equine or livestock animal's reaction to sound, a sudden movement, or an unfamiliar object, person, or other animal;
(3) with respect to equine activities, certain land conditions and hazards, including surface and subsurface conditions;
(4) a collision with another animal or an object; or
(5) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or another, including failing to maintain control over the equine or livestock animal or not acting within the participant's ability.
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 87.003).

The court summarized this "inherent risk doctrine" as providing that "co-participant and nonparticipant defendants owe no duty to protect a participant from risks inherent in the sport or activity in which he has chosen to take part." Id. at *3. The court noted that it was the defendant's burden to conclusively establish the facts necessary to determine that the plaintiff's injuries were caused in a manner consistent with the risks inherent to the particular equine activity in question. Id. at *5.

The court acknowledged that the defendant had conclusively established that the plaintiff's horse had panicked after a vine wrapped around its flank, and that such behavior was not unusual in that situation. Id. at *6. However, the court found that she had failed to establish that no genuine issue of fact existed as to whether such risk was common to trail riding. Id. The court further concluded that even if the defendant had met her initial summary judgment burden, the result would not change because § 87.004 of the Equine Activity Act provides an exception to the limitation on liability. Id. at *9. That section states that a person will be liable for injury if the person provided the animal and the person did not make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine the ability of a participant to engage safely in the equine activity and to safely manage the animal. Id. at *9 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 87.004) The evidence showed that the plaintiff had limited experience with horse riding and that the defendant had not inquired about it, although there was also evidence that the defendant knew that the plaintiff had extensive experience with breeding and raising horses. Id. at *10. The court thus reversed the order granting summary judgment to the defendant because there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute regarding whether § 87.004 applied. Id. A dissenting justice opined that the evidence had clearly established that the defendant's discussions with the plaintiff prior to allowing her to ride the horse satisfied the requirements of § 87.004, so summary judgment should have been affirmed. Id. at *14-15.

The case was decided on January 30, 2009.