Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Administrative Law

NAD's Refusal to Consider a Claim Constituted a "Determination" Subject to
Time Limits of 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)

Walt McCarter
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Estate of Henegar v. United States Department of Agriculture, No. 2:07-CV-183, 2008 WL 3540066 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2008), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that the USDA National Appeals Division's written refusal to consider the plaintiff's application for attorney's fees constituted an agency "determination," and therefore plaintiff's district court complaint was barred by the 30-day time limit set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).

Background

After the USDA National Appeals Division (NAD) awarded certain tobacco program payments to the estate of Silles Ray Henegar, the estate moved for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Id. at *1. The NAD director denied the application because the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had not found the EAJA applicable to NAD proceedings, and the estate brought this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the EAJA was applicable to NAD proceedings. Id.

Arguments

The defendants argued that the estate's complaint did not satisfy the EAJA jurisdictional requirements because the appeal was not filed until after the 30-day time limit set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Id.

The estate argued that the NAD's refusal to consider the application was not a "determination," so the appeal was not untimely. Id. It also argued that that the defendants should be estopped from relying on the 30-day time limit because their refusal to consider the claim was in bad faith and in contravention of legal authority and public policy. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

A dissatisfied party may appeal an administrative determination to the district court within 30 days after the determination was made. See id. at *2 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)). The court reasoned that it did not matter that the NAD's denial of attorney's fees was a refusal to consider rather than a decision on the merits, and held that the NAD director's denial of attorney's fees constituted a "determination," and therefore the estate's complaint was barred because it was filed a year after that determination. Id. The court also refused to estop the defendants from making the time-limit argument because it could not find any bad faith on their part. Id.

The case was decided on August 11, 2008.