Summary of a Recent
Judicial
Development in
Environmental Law
EPA's Decision Related to Child Safety Measure for Rodenticides
Was Arbitrary and Capricious
Eric H. FoyNational AgLaw Center Research Associate
Summary of Decision
In West Harlem Environmental Action v. EPA, 380 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff advocacy groups sued the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) alleging that the agency violated the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136, by revoking child safety measures on rodenticides. The court held that the EPA had sufficient evidence to revoke indicator dye requirements, but the agency's decision to rescind a bittering agent requirement for rodenticides was arbitrary and capricious.
Background
In 2001, the EPA revoked two rodenticide child safety measures that it had put in place in 1998. Id. at 290. On November 9, 2004, plaintiffs West Harlem Environmental Action and the Natural Resources Defense Council brought the instant action, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. §§ 136n(a) and (c) against the EPA alleging that the revocation violated both FIFRA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500. Id. Both sides motioned for summary judgment. Id. at 290, 293.
Arguments
The plaintiffs argued that the "EPA's 2001 reregistration of the rodenticides in question without the previously required mitigation measures cause[d] 'unreasonable adverse effects on the environment' in violation of FIFRA." Id. at 293.
Analysis and Holdings
In considering the plaintiffs' argument, the court was required to decide "whether EPA's action under FIFRA was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.'" Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency "relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs' Ass'n of United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
In applying this standard to the EPA's choice to rescind the indicator dye requirement, the court held that the agency had sufficient evidence to support its decision. Id. at 294. However, the court felt differently about the EPA's decision to rescind the bittering agent requirement. Id. In making this decision, the EPA relied only on "an informal report of a field study conducted by the City of Chicago in 1994 after the city noted an increase in the rat population and learned that the manufacturers of the rodenticide it had been using for years had recently added a bittering agent." Id. at 294-95. The court stated that the Chicago report was "long on rhetoric but short on analysis" and "provide[d] no reasonable basis for concluding that there [was] a causal relationship between the addition of the bittering agent and the increased rat population." Id. at 295. In general, the court held that the EPA severely lacked the evidence needed to justify its reversal of the bittering agent requirement. Id. Therefore, the court granted the EPA's motion for summary judgment regarding the withdrawal of the indicator dye requirement, and granted the plaintiffs' motion regarding the bittering agent. Id. at 296.
The case was decided on August 7, 2005.