Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Labor

Manufacturers Not Joint Employers with
Farm Labor Contractors

Amy Lowenthal
National AgLaw Center Research Fellow

Summary of Decision

In Gonzalez-Sanchez v. International Paper Co., 346 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that two paper manufacturers were not joint employers along with the farm labor contractors that employed the plaintiffs and therefore could not be held liable for monetary relief under either the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 or the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Protection Act ("AWPA"), U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872. See id. The court further held that although the plaintiffs did not prevail on the joint employer issue, that fact alone did not make the issue of class certification moot, and it therefore remanded the case back to the district court on the class certification issue. See id.

Background

Defendants International Paper Company (IP) and Union Camp Corporation (UC), are manufacturing companies that cultivate forest land to produce paper products. See id. at 1020. The defendants used farm labor contractors to provide workers to maintain the forest land. See id. Five migrant employees of farm labor contractors sued the defendants for monetary relief under violations of the FLSA and the AWPA. See id. at 1019. The migrant employees claimed that the defendants were joint employers with the farm labor contractors. See id. Suing on behalf of themselves and other migrant workers, the plaintiffs requested class certification. See id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that they were not joint employers and therefore determining that certification of a class would be moot. See id. at 1017. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to the Eleventh Circuit. See id.

Arguments

The plaintiffs argued that the defendants, along with the farm labor contractors, were their joint employers and were therefore liable for the monetary damages owed for their alleged violations of FLSA and AWPA. See id. at 1020.

Analysis and Holdings

The court explained that both FLSA and AWPA define the term "employ" as when an entity "'suffer[s] or permit[s] an individual to work.'" Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) and 29 U.S.C. § 1802(5)). It also explained that "'[a]n entity 'suffers or permits' an individual to work if, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is dependant on the entity.'" Id. (quoting Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999)) (citation omitted). The court further explained that because "joint employment relationships-where a single individual stands in relation of an employee to two or more persons at the same time-are common in agriculture, . . . both statutes deliberately make 'it clear that a worker can be economically dependent on, and thus jointly employed by more than one entity at the same time.'" Id. (quoting Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 929 (11th Cir. 1996)). See also (29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5). Finally, the court explained that a joint employment relationship exists if, as a matter of economic reality, a laborer is dependent upon both the farm labor contractor and the agricultural employer, but "if the two entities are commonly disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee, a joint employment situation does not exist." Id. at 1021 (citing Antenor, 88 F.3d at 930; 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5)).

The court used the seven factors discussed in Martinez Mendoza v. Champion International Corp., 340 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2003) as a guidepost in determining whether the defendants were joint employers. See id. at 1021. The Champion factors addressed whether the agricultural employer has direct control over the worker, the employer's hiring and firing power, the duration of the relationship between the employer and employee, the complexity of skills required by the worker, how integral was the task performed in light of the business operation, whether the job was performed on the employer's premises, and whether the job was the kind ordinarily performed by actual employees. See id.

The court determined that the evidence presented did not support the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants had direct control over the workers. See id. at 1022. The court also determined that the defendants did not exercise power customary to the role of employer, such as, the power to hire and fire and issue payroll. See id. at 1022, 1023. The court further determined that forestry maintenance was just a small part-not an integral part-of the defendants' business operation. See id. at 1022.

The court therefore held that the defendants were not joint employers along with the farm labor contractors of the migrant workers. See id. at 1023. The court also held, however, that its holding did not automatically preclude consideration of the plaintiffs' request for class certification. See id. See Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1383 n.16 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (recognizing that in some cases a plaintiff can appeal a decision to deny class certification even if the plaintiff no longer has a controversy with the defendant). The court therefore remanded the matter to the district court with respect to the class certification issue. See id.

The case was decided on September 25, 2003; this summary was posted Mar. 2, 2004.