Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Agriculture and Urbanization

Nuisance Protection for Animal Feeding
Operations Held Unconstitutional

Jennifer Williams
National AgLaw Center Graduate Assistant

Summary of Decision

In Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004), the Iowa Supreme Court held that a Right-to-Farm law that purported to provide nuisance immunity to animal feeding operations violated the Iowa constitution "to the extent it deprives property owners of a remedy for the taking of their property resulting from a nuisance created by an animal feeding operation." Id. at 171. The court also held that the Right-to-Farm law violated the Iowa constitution as an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power.

Background

Plaintiffs Joe and Linda Gacke lived on their farm since 1974. See id. at 171. Defendant Pork Xtra, L.L.C. ("Pork Xtra") was a family farming corporation that owned and operated "two hog confinement buildings" that were built in 1996 and were located about 1300 feet from the plaintiffs' property. Id. In 2000, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Pork Xtra alleging that its hog operation was a nuisance and "had caused personal injury to them, including emotional distress, and had resulted in a decrease in the value of their property." Id. Pork Xtra asserted that Iowa Code § 657.11(2), which provides nuisance immunity to animal feeding operations, precluded the plaintiffs' nuisance action. See id. More specifically, § 657.11(2) provides in in part that

an animal feeding operation . . . shall not be found to be a public or private nuisance . . . and the animal feeding operation shall not be found to interfere with another person's comfortable use and enjoyment of the person's life or property under any other cause of action.

Id.

The trial court rejected Pork Xtra's defense, holding that the statute effected an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs' property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 18 of the Iowa Constitution. See id. Both parties appealed the trial court decision to the Iowa Supreme Court. See id.

Arguments

Pork Xtra's main argument was that the district court erred in holding § 657.11(2) unconstitutional. See id. at 172. It argued that § 657.11(2) was distinguishable from other nuisance protection statutes that had been held unconstitutional. See id. at 172, 175.

The plaintiffs argued that there were no errors in the district court's ruling. See id. They also asserted "an alternative basis to uphold the . . . [trial] court's ruling that the statutory immunity was unavailable: section 657.11(2) is unconstitutional under the Inalienable Rights Clause" of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 172.

Analysis and Holdings

The court first considered whether the nuisance immunity provided under § 657.11(2) effected an unconstitutional taking. See id. It noted that the trial court based its decision on the holding in Bormann v. Board of Sup'rs, 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998), a case in which the Iowa Supreme Court held that the nuisance immunity statute at issue in that case was an unconstitutional taking of property under the United States and Iowa Constitutions. Id. In so doing, it rejected Pork Xtra's arguments that § 657.11(2) was distinguishable from the statute at issue in Bormann. Based upon Bormann, the court found that the nuisance protection offered by Section 657.11(2) effected an unconstitutional taking. See id.

The court did not completely disagree with Pork Xtra's contention that "even if the statutory immunity violated the Takings Clause, it is unconstitutional only to the extent that it prohibits a remedy for the actual taking of the plaintiff's property." Id. The court held that "recovery of diminution-in-value damages fully compensates the burdened property owners for the unlawful taking of an easement, the restrictions of the Takings Clause end at that point. The Taking Clause does not prohibit limitations on other damages recoverable under a nuisance theory." Id. at 175. The court decided that the nuisance immunity is invalidated only to the point where it prevents property owners from recovering for loss of property value. See id. It also stated that "[t]he Takings Clause does not prohibit the legislature from granting animal feeding operations immunity from liability for any other damages traditionally allowed under a nuisance theory of recover." Id. As such, the court held that the trial court was incorrect when it ruled that the nuisance immunity was unconstitutional "without distinguishing the elements of damage in a nuisance claim from the compensation demanded under the Takings Clause." Id. The court noted though, that this was "not necessarily dispositive of the plaintiff's claim that [the statute] is unconstitutional, however, as the plaintiffs relied on several constitutional provisions in attacking the statute," not just the Takings Clause. Id. at 175.

The court also considered whether the § 657.11(2) violated the Inalienable Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution. See id. The plaintiffs argued that under this clause, protection of property under the state constitution is an inalienable right and as such the legislature cannot provide immunity from a nuisance claim. See id. at 175-76. The court stated that these protections are not absolute and the question to be determined was whether "the state reasonably exercise[d] its police power by sanctioning a livestock producer's interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of their land." Id. at 176-77. The court held that while the law did serve a public purpose, that "as applied to the Gackes [it was] unduly oppressive and, therefore, not a reasonable exercise of the state's police power." Id. at 178-79. The court declared that in order to be constitutional, the means used must be both "'reasonably necessary' and not 'unduly oppressive'," and in this the statute failed. Id. at 178.

While the court found the statute unconstitutional in this case, it expressly stated that it "express[ed] no opinion as to whether the statute might be constitutionally applied under other circumstances." Id. at 179. The court remanded the case on other grounds, but held overall that the trial court "did not err in refusing to allow the defendant to assert the immunity defense." Id. at 185.

The case was decided on June 16, 2004; this summary was posted Jan. 6, 2005.