Summary of a Recent
Judicial
Development in
Labor
Township Zoning Ordinance Governing
Migrant Housing Upheld
Gaby R. JabbourId.National AgLaw Center Research Assistant
Summary of Decision
In Frens Orchards, Inc. v. Dayton Tp. Bd., 654 N.W.2d 346 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a township zoning ordinance that restricted the location of migrant worker housing was not preempted by either state law or related administrative rules pertaining to agricultural labor camps.
Background
Plaintiff Frens Orchards, Inc. operated a farm that employed migrant workers and provided temporary housing for them during harvest season. See id. The plaintiff decided to build additional housing units to meet its future labor needs and obtained preliminary authorization from the Michigan Department of Agriculture (MDA) to do so. See id. However, the MDA informed the plaintiff that it needed to obtain a special exception use permit from the township board in order to proceed with the construction "because the township's zoning ordinance does not permit this type of housing in the Agricultural-3 (A-3) district where [the] plaintiff's land [was] situated." Id. The plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaration that the township's ordinance was preempted by state law and other administrative rules. See id. After the trial court rejected the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. See id.
Arguments
The plaintiff argued that the ordinance was preempted by the Michigan Public Health Code, the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act (MIOSHA), and related administrative rules. See id.
Analysis and Holding
The court explained that "[a] state law preempts an ordinance 'if 1) the statute completely occupies the field that the ordinance attempts to regulate, or 2) the ordinance directly conflicts with a state statute.'" Id. at 349 (citation omitted). The court held that with respect to the first factor the ordinance was not preempted because "the location of agricultural labor camps [was] not pervasively regulated by the Public Health Code or its associated administrative rules." Id. at 350.
Turning to the second factor, the court explained that "'[i]t has been held that in determining whether the provisions of a municipal ordinance conflict with a statute covering the same subject, the test is Id.whether the ordinance prohibits an act which the statute permits, or permits an act which the statute prohibits.'" Id. at 351 (quotation omitted). Applying this test to the present case, the court found that no conflict existed between the ordinance and the state laws and related rules because "the state regulations [did] not address the subject of the zoning ordinance-the location of a use of land within the township." Id.
The case was decided on September 24, 2002; this summary was posted Apr. 6, 2004.
