Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Environmental Law

Intentional Act Exception to Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act
Requires a Legitimate Intentional Act

Eric H. Foy
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Fanguy v. Eastover Country Club L.L.C., No. Civ.A. 01-3778, 2002 WL 1888901 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2002), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied a plaintiff's motion to remand and held that it could appropriately exercise diversity of citizenship federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff brought action against his employer and a chemical company in response to personal injuries he sustained while spraying herbicides during the course of employment. Because the plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action against his employer in state court, the complete diversity rule was satisfied and removal was appropriate.

Background

The plaintiff, a former country club groundskeeper and resident of Louisiana, claimed that his employer required him to spray certain herbicides on club grounds, and, as a result, he sustained personal injuries including contracting Parkinson's Disease. Id. at *1. The plaintiff's family sought additional damages for their own personal injuries and loss of consortium. Id. According to the plaintiff, the Louisiana's Worker's Compensation Act (LWCA) did not bar his action because his employer "knew to an absolute certainty that injury was certain to occur when [the plaintiff] was exposed to the poisons without the required equipment," and therefore the LWCA's intentional act exception excepted his causes of action. Id. After filing action against the defendant country club and Southern Agricultural Insecticides, Inc. (Southern) in state court, Southern removed the case to the instant court invoking diversity of citizenship federal jurisdiction. Id. Southern and all other defendants, non-residents of Louisiana, claimed that the country club, a resident of Louisiana, was fraudulently joined to destroy diversity. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to remand. Id.

Arguments

The plaintiff claimed that his action fell within the intentional act exception to the LWCA because, "by concealing warning labels and refusing protective equipment," the country club knew that the plaintiff would be exposed to harmful chemicals and sustain personal injuries. Id. at *2.

The defendants asserted that remand would be inappropriate because the plaintiff fraudulently joined the in-state defendant country club to destroy diversity. Id. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff's claims against the country club were barred by the LWCA because they did not fit within its intentional act exception.

Analysis and Holdings

Because the removing party bears the burden of showing that the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, the removing party must show either that the plaintiff has no claim against the allegedly fraudulently joined party in state court, or that the plaintiff fraudulently pleaded jurisdictional facts. Id. Additionally, the facts must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. Under the LWCA's intentional act exception, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1032, an "employee is not limited to worker's compensation and may pursue any other remedy where his compensable injury resulted from an intentional act." Id. In other words, if the plaintiff could prove that the country club either consciously desired the plaintiff's injuries, or knew to a substantial certainty that such injuries would follow, the LWCA would not bar the plaintiff's claims against the country club. Id. Ultimately, the court held that the country club's action in not supplying appropriate safety equipment rose to the level of gross negligence, but it did not fall within the LWCA's intentional act exception. Id. at *3. Therefore the LWCA barred the plaintiff's claims against the country club, and the instant court maintained jurisdiction.

The case was decided on August 16, 2002.