Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Commercial Transactions

Negligence Per Se Jury Instructions Proper

Steve White
National AgLaw Center Graduate Assistant

Summary of Decision

In Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a negligence per se jury instruction was proper based on the state's Commercial Feed Law.

Background

The Duxburys were farmers who raised corn and hogs. Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, 681 N.W.2d at 384. Defendant Spex Foods, Inc. was a company that produced and sold feed and feed additives and operated a grain bank at which farmers could deliver corn and "receive a proportional share of the corn commingled in the bank." Id.

The Duxburys delivered grain to the grain bank in 1998 and 1999. See id. They made arrangements with Spex for hog feed to be made from their share of corn in the grain bank. See id. The Duxburys' hogs experienced gestational problems caused by toxins in the hog feed they purchased from Spex. See id. Consequently, they brought an action warranty against Spex under various legal theories, including negligence per se. See id. The jury ruled in favor of the Duxburys' and Spex appealed that judgement to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. See id.

Arguments

Spex argued that the negligence per se jury instruction was improper because the Commercial Feed Law upon which the instruction was based did not regulate its conduct and hence did "not establish an applicable standard of care." Id. at 389.

Analysis and Holding

The court rejected Spex's argument that the statute did not apply to its conduct. See id. It explained that § 25.38 of the Minnesota Commercial Feed Law provided that "'[t]he following acts and causing the following acts in Minnesota are prohibited: (1) manufacture or distribution of any commercial feed that is adulterated or misbranded[.]'" Id. It also explained that the statute did not limit the class of people prohibited from "manufacturing or distributing adulterated commercial feed." Id. In rejecting Spex's argument, it noted that Spex was in the business of manufacturing and selling commercial feed.

The court further stated that "per se instructions may be given if "(1)' the persons harmed by [the] violation [of a statute] are within the intended protection of the statute' and (2) 'the harm suffered is of the type the [statute] was intended to prevent.'" Id. (citations omitted). The court held that since the Commercial Feed Law was intended to protect farmers "from harmful animal feeds" and because the damage in this case was caused by such feed the negligence per se instruction was proper. Id.

The case was decided on June 15, 2004; this summary was posted Feb. 16, 2005.