Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Environmental Law

Challenge to California's Pesticide Registration Program
Rendered Moot by Intervening Legislation

Eric H. Foy
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Chemical Producers and Distributors Association v. Helliker, 463 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2006), the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the ruling of the district court, which had granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff, a pesticide trade organization, brought this action against the Director of the California Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) to enjoin a generic pesticide registration program. The instant court held that intervening amendments to California's pesticide registration laws rendered the plaintiff's appeal moot and vacated the district court's ruling.

Background

Both the state of California and the federal government require prospective pesticide sellers to file a pesticide registration application, including "extensive data on the health and environmental effects of their pesticides." Id. at 873 (citing Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 12811; 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a)). Pesticide registration procedures can be extremely costly; therefore, "applicants seeking to register pesticides with the same active ingredients as previously registered pesticides have incentive to acquire and use data submitted by prior registrants." Id. To protect original registrants from "re-use of data by secondary registration applicants," the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) provides original registrants with ten years of exclusive use. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(i)). During the ten-year period, secondary registrants may only use protected data with written permission from the original registrant. Id. After the ten-year exclusive use period, there is a five year period during which secondary registrants may use the information only if they offer to compensate the original registrant and their offer is accepted. Id. If their offer is refused, secondary users may only obtain access through binding arbitration. Id. at 873-74. Once the five-year period expires, the information is freely available for use by secondary registrants. Id. at 874. However, California law differed from FIFRA, providing that "a secondary applicant could never use previously submitted data without permission from the original submitter, who could hold out for any price or refuse authorization altogether." Id. (citing Cal.Code Regs. tit. 3, § 6170(c)).

The plaintiffs brought the instant action against the DPR challenging the state's pesticide information protection regime. Id. They "sought an injunction and a declaration that the California statute was preempted" by FIFRA. Id. Although the DPR declined to defend the law, several parties intervened as defendants in support of the California law. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the intervening defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. Id. While the plaintiff's appeal was pending, California amended its pesticide registration law, "eliminat[ing] any state law period of exclusive use by the original data submitter." Id. The amendment officially abolished "California law's extension of the exclusive use period beyond FIFRA's ten years." Id. at 875.

Arguments

Following the amendment of California's law, the plaintiff argued that its appeal was moot and moved for vacatur. Id.

The intervening defendants disagreed with the plaintiff's posture regarding both mootness and vacatur. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

According to Ninth Circuit case law, when intervening legislation settles a case concerning only injunctive or declaratory relief, the case is rendered moot. Id. In the instant case, the plaintiff "sought only injunctive and declaratory relief"; therefore, the crux of the case was "whether California's amended statute ha[d] settled [the plaintiff's] controversy." Id. Ultimately, the court held that the statutory amendment had settled the controversy. Id.

The court then addressed whether the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine applied. Id. at 877. The intervening defendants argued, "a [party's] voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice." Id. However, the court held that the voluntary cessation exception only applied to "rare cases in which it is 'virtually certain that the repealed law will be reenacted.'" Id. at 878. The court dispensed with this argument because "there [was] no reason to think the California legislature enacted the amendment with a mind to restoring the old law later." Id.

Lastly, the court responded to the intervening defendants' argument against vacatur. Id. at 878-79. The defendant intervenors argued that "the [plaintiff's] advocacy before the California Legislature voluntarily mooted this case, thus precluding vacatur by this court." Id. at 879. Disagreeing, the court held that, "[l]obbying Congress or a state legislature cannot be viewed as 'causing' subsequent legislation for purposes of the vacatur inquiry." Id. at 879. Continuing, the court stated, "[a]ttributing the actions of a legislature to third parties rather than to the legislature itself is of dubious legitimacy, and the cases uniformly decline to do so." Id.

The case was decided on August 31, 2006.