Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Equine Law

Animal Vaccines Action Not Subject
to Complete Preemption

Jennifer Williams
National AgLaw Center Graduate Assistant

Summary of Decision

In Arnold v. Intervet, Inc., 305 F. Supp.2d 548 (D. Md. 2003), the United States District Court for the District of Maryland found that federal regulation of animal vaccines did not completely preempt the field of regulation and therefore did not require a federal court to hear all claims related to use of animal vaccines.

Background

Horse owners sued Intervet, Inc. (Intervet) after their racehorses became ill and were unable to race after being treated with a vaccine produced by Intervet. See id. at 549. The suit was filed in state court alleging claims of "negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and breach of express warranty." Id.

Arguments

Defendants filed to remove the case to federal court "relying on the alleged preemptive effect of the Virus, Serums, Toxins, Antitoxins and Analogous Products Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. . . . and the regulations issued thereunder by the Secretary . . . of Agriculture." Id. at 549-50. Plaintiffs contended that the Act did not completely preempt the field of regulation and that there was not direct federal question jurisdiction. See id. at 550-51.

Analysis and Holdings

The court found that "no case has held, or even intimated, that the preemptive force of the federal regulation of animal vaccines is encompassed by the 'complete preemption' doctrine . . . ." Id. at 550. It further noted that

no case . . . has ever denied a motion to remand a case . . . that was removed to federal court where plaintiff asserted, as here, solely ostensible state common law damages claims arising out of the use of an animal vaccine. To the contrary, all of the cases discussing the preemptive effect of the Act (and more pointedly, the related regulations promulgated thereunder) have seemingly understood that it was "conflict preemption" and not "complete preemption" that was at issue.

Id. at 550-51.

The court rejected the theory of direct federal question jurisdiction because "the federal regulation extinguishes causes of action, it does not create causes of action." Id. at 551 n2. It also stated that there was "no discernible genuine dispute of federal law between the parties requiring resolution in this case." Id. As a result, the court found there was "sufficient doubt as to the removability of this case." Id. at 551. It then remanded the case to state court for further action. See id.

The case was decided on May 12, 2003; this summary was posted Oct. 13, 2004.