Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Labor

Compensable Work-Related Activities Under the FLSA

Walt McCarter
National AgLaw Center Research Associate

Summary of Decision

In Anderson v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 2009 WL 653027 (M.D. Ala. 2009), the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Southern Division, held that the question of whether time spent donning, doffing, and sanitizing protective equipment; walking to and from work stations; and waiting to clock in was "integral or indispensable" to principal work activities, and therefore compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), required resolution of genuine issues of material fact. The court denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on those claims; however, the court did grant the employer-defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to time spent clearing security, holding that such time was not compensable because it was preliminary to a principal activity.

Background

Employees at a chicken processing plant brought a collective action under the FLSA alleging that their employer failed to compensate them for all compensable time. Id. at *1. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought compensation for time spent donning, doffing, and sanitizing equipment; walking to and from work stations; waiting to clock in; clearing security; and meal breaks. Id. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Id.

Analysis and Holdings

The FLSA requires employers to compensate employees for activities "controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business," and for incidental activities that are "integral or indispensable" to principal work activities. Id. at *5 (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 25 (2005)). It was undisputed that donning, doffing, and sanitizing personal protection equipment was required by the employer and necessary for the employees to perform their duties; however, the court found that the question of who was the primary beneficiary of the activity was a disputed issue of material fact, and therefore denied summary judgment on that issue. Id. at *8-11. The court pointed out that, as a general rule, time spent waiting to clock in or out and walking to or from work stations is not compensable; however, if it occurs between principal activities, it is compensable. Id. at *13. The court found that resolution of those underlying factual issues was necessary to make a determination regarding the compensability of walking and waiting time, and denied summary judgment on those issues as well. Id.

As for meal breaks, the court noted that short breaks lasting from five to about twenty minutes are generally counted as hours worked. Id. at *14 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 785.18). Under federal regulations, meal breaks may not be compensable if the employee is completely relieved from duty during the break and if the purpose of the meal period is to eat a regular meal. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 785.19). The court reasoned that resolution of the donning and doffing time and other issues was required before it could rule on the meal time issue, because if it determined that the donning and doffing time (and thus the walking and waiting time) were not "integral and indispensable," no compensatory activity would be taking place during scheduled meal times, and the meal period would therefore not be compensable. Id. at *15. The court did grant the employer's motion for summary judgment on the issue of time spent clearing security, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation for that time because clearing security is preliminary to a principal activity. Id.

The case was decided on March 10, 2009.