Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Labor

Farmer Building Farmworker Housing
Exempted from County Housing Code

Randal Busby
National AgLaw Center Research Assistant

An owner of farm property who wanted to construct residential buildings on his property to house farmworkers brought an action in trial court seeking an order that would require the county to exempt him from the requirement that he comply with the building permit process while constructing the housing. Trust v. County of Yuma, 69 P.3d 510 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). The trial court ruled in favor of the farm property owner, and the county appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See id. The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the farm property owner did not have to comply with the building permit process because free, on-site housing for farmworkers was "incidental to farming," as defined by Arizona law. See id. at 512-15. It also ruled that the county was precluded from asserting an equal protection claim and that the state statutes that exempted the property owner from complying with the building permit process did not violate equal protection under the Arizona Constitution or the United States Constitution. See id. at 515-16.

Braden Trust owned a 7,500-acre farm located in Yuma County, Arizona ("County"). See id. He planned to construct housing on his farm property to house farmworkers. See id. Trust believed that under Arizona state law he was not required to obtain building permits from the County for the construction project. See id. . See id. Defining agricultural buildings "as structures for such uses as farm implements and grain storage, not for human occupancy," the County asserted that Trust's proposed construction project was residential in nature, rather than agricultural and Trust therefore was required to comply with the building permit process. Id.

Trust filed a complaint in trial court "for special action, mandamus and declaratory judgment, and sought an order directing the County to exempt . . . [him] from complying with the building permit process and building code with regard to existing and planned residential buildings." Id. The trial court ruled that Trust was exempt from the County's building and zoning codes and that his proposal to build farmworker housing "constituted construction incidental to farming and agriculture and thus was not subject to the County building and zoning codes." Id. It also issued a declaratory judgment "ordering the County to allow . . . Trust to construct farm-worker housing free from interference and from any requirements to comply with the County building or zoning codes." Id.

On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals court first examined whether the trial court had correctly interpreted Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-830 and 11-865 "to mean that residential structures built on a farm to house farm workers are exempt from county zoning and building codes." Id. at 511-12. Section 11-830 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]othing contained in any ordinance authorized by this chapter shall: . . . [p]revent, restrict or otherwise regulate the use or occupation of land or improvements for railroad, mining, metallurgical, grazing or general agricultural purposes, if the tract concerned is five or more contiguous commercial acres." Id. at 512 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-830(A)(2)). Section 11-865 provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he provisions of this article shall not be construed to apply to: . . . [c]onstruction or operation incidental to . . . farming, dairying, agriculture, viti-culture, horticulture or stock or poultry raising . . . ." Id. (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-865(A)(1)).

The County argued that the plain meanings of the phrases "'use or occupation of land or improvements for . . . general agricultural purposes' and '[c]onstruction or operation incidental to . . . agriculture' do not encompass multifamily residential dwellings." Id. It asserted that the statutory language only exempted "structures that house such things as agricultural products, farm implements, or tools-not people." Id. It also asserted that "farm-worker housing has its own function independent of agricultural purposes and is not intended to serve agricultural purposes, as distinguished, for example, from a barn." Id.

Trust argued that the farmworker housing served both "'general agricultural purposes'" and was "'incidental to agriculture.'" Id. He reasoned that the occupants of the apartments would be employed full-time on the farm and that providing on-site housing would relieve them of the burden of having to drive long distances to work. See id. He noted that courts in other jurisdictions have examined the application of similar statutes to farmworker housing and "have all concluded that such dwellings are exempt from zoning and/or building codes." Id.

The court explained that the primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent behind the statute. See id. (citation omitted). It also explained that it would interpret a statute contrary to its plain meaning "'only if necessary to effectuate the legislature's clearly expressed contrary intent or to avoid an absurd result that the legislature could not in any event have intended.'" Id. (citation omitted). It further explained that it assumed that the legislature accorded words their "natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated." Id. (citations omitted).

The court noted that the terms used in Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-830 and 11-865 were "quite broad in their scope and application." Id. It explained that although the phrase "general agricultural purposes" in § 11-830(A)(2) was not defined in the planning and zoning statutes, other statutes had illustrated the broad scope of the phrase "general agricultural purposes." Id. The court noted, for example, that in the valuation of "'agricultural property' for taxation purposes, 'residential dwellings that are maintained for occupancy by agricultural employees as a condition of employment or as a convenience to the employer' are valued as agricultural land." Id. (citation omitted).

The court found the language in § 11-865(A)(1) to be quite broad. See id. It stated that the term "incidental" "is generally defined as '[s]ubordinate to something of greater importance; having a minor role." Id. (citing Black's Law Dictionary 765 (7th ed. 1990)). It also stated that "'construction or operation' that is 'incidental' to farming or agriculture does not necessarily involve the primary functions of the farm but, instead, may concern functions that are tangentially related to the principal activity of the farm." Id. at 513. It further stated that "[o]n-site housing for full-time farm workers can be said to be 'incidental' to farming because housing the workers on the farm is a subordinate accommodation to their primary role as employees and because free, on-site housing arguably benefits both the employer and the workers in terms of safety and productivity." Id.

The court concluded that

[b]ecause the statutory language is broad enough to include farm-worker housing and the statutes at issue do not preclude residential dwellings from the exemption from county zoning and building codes, we conclude that on-site dwellings for farm workers, like those proposed by Braden Trust, fall within the provisions of §§ 11-830(A)(2) and 11-865(A)(1). Our conclusion is consistent with decisions by courts from other states that have determined that farm housing is incidental to farming or agriculture and/or that it serves an agricultural purpose."

Id.

The court also examined whether "treating farm workers differently from other workers whose employers provide housing violates the equal protection clauses of both the Arizona and United States Constitutions." Id. at 515 (see Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 13; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). The court explained that the guarantee of equal protection under the Arizona and United States Constitutions "'require that all persons subject to state legislation shall be treated alike under similar circumstances.'" Id. (citation omitted). It also explained that considerations of equal protection "do not prohibit unequal treatment between people of different classes as long as the classification is reasonable." Id. (citations omitted).

The County argued that the relevant class for purposes of the equal protection analysis was all workers whose employers provided housing and who resided in counties that have adopted building codes. See id. It argued that § 11-865(A)(1) "discriminates against the subclass of workers employed in agriculture because the statute deprives them of 'the minimum life, safety and health requirements and inspections provided by the building codes.'" Id. Trust argued that the County was not entitled to attack the constitutionality of the statute on equal protection grounds. See id.

The court agreed with Trust's assertion, stating that because the County was neither a "'citizen'" under the Arizona Constitution nor a "'person'" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it was not entitled to assert an equal protection claim. Id. (citations omitted). The court added that

[f]urthermore, neither § 11-830(A)(2) nor § 11-865(A)(1) denies farm workers equal protection because these statutes, which exempt a broad array of entities that collectively comprise the agricultural industry from complying with zoning and building code requirements, are not directed at farm workers per se, let alone farm workers of any particular racial or ethnic background.

Id. (citation omitted).

The case was decided on June 3, 2003; this summary was posted August, 2003