Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Agriculture and Urbanization

Permanent Injunction that Enjoined
Irrigation Practices Reversed

Lynn Cox
National AgLaw Center Research Assistant

In an action brought by landowners against neighboring landowners for negligence, nuisance, trespass, and seeking injunctive relief because their home suffered flood damage, allegedly as a result of their neighbors' irrigation practices, the Montana Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a permanent injunction enjoining the neighboring landowners from continuing their irrigation practices when the district court's own findings and conclusions were that the plaintiffs' flood irrigation practices were lawful. Wells v. Young, 47 P.3d 809, 812-13 (Mont. 2002).

Dwayne and Nancy Young, defendants, owned thirteen acres of real property near Hardin, Montana, that they irrigated periodically. See id. at 809-10. The Youngs earned approximately $400.00 a year from the crop production on their irrigated parcel of property. See id. at 810. They had irrigated this parcel of land for decades. See id. at 809.

In 1992, Jon and Candy Wells, plaintiffs, purchased property and built a home adjacent to the Youngs' irrigated parcel of property. See id. at 810. Between the summer of 1994 and the fall of 1998, the Youngs irrigated their property three times, and on each occasion the Wells experienced flooding in the crawl space of their home. See id. The Wells brought an action in district court against the Youngs for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, claiming that the flooding caused approximately $80,000.00 in damages. See id. The Wells also requested that the court issue "a permanent injunction prohibiting future flood irrigation on the Youngs' property." Id.

The district court determined that the Youngs' flood irrigation practices were "'typical of the practice of irrigators who utilize flood irrigation of crops.'" Id. It also determined that it was unlikely that the Youngs' flood irrigation practices caused a rise in groundwater so substantial as to cause the flooding experienced in the Wellses' home. See id. It stated that the "'most plausible and credible explanation of the flooding' was the existence of a 'subsurface pathway or conduit, most likely an abandoned United States Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") ditch' extending from the head ditch on the Youngs' property to the Wells' home." Id. Despite making these findings, the district court determined that the "'saturation of the soils around the Wells' residence and the entry of water into the Wells' crawl space occurred as a result of the flood irrigation practices used in irrigating the Youngs' field in 1994 and in 1998.'" Id.

Since the Youngs irrigated their land before the Wells built their home, the district court ruled that the Wells were precluded from recovering damages under Montana law. See id. It also ruled that the Wells could not recover under their trespass claim pursuant to Montana law and that their nuisance claim was barred under Mont. Code Ann. § 27-30-101(3), which states that a farming or agricultural operation that has been in operation longer than the complaining resident has been in possession cannot be a nuisance. See id. The district court also rejected the Wellses' negligence claim because they failed to establish that the Youngs' flood irrigation practices breached the standard of care of a reasonable farm irrigator engaged in flood irrigation. See id.

However, the district court permanently enjoined the Youngs from irrigating their property because "future irrigation without modification to the head ditch would result in 'an unreasonable and substantial risk of continuing harm and irreparable injury to the Wellses' property.'" Id. Thus, it determined that "the imposition of a permanent injunction preventing flood irrigation on the Youngs' property was justified until said irrigation practices did not result in the saturation of soil on the Wells' property and the entry of water into the Wells' home." Id. The Youngs appealed the district court's decision to the Montana Supreme Court. See id.

The Montana Supreme Court first considered whether the district court erred as both a matter of law and equity when it permanently enjoined the Youngs' from irrigating their property. See id. The Youngs argued that "neither law nor equity permits the imposition of a permanent injunction precluding lawful irrigation practices." Id. at 811. They asserted that Mont. Code Ann. § 27-19-102- the applicable statute which governs the imposition of permanent injunctions- requires a "breach of an obligation as a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent injunction." Id. Noting that the district court did not expressly find that they breached a duty or an obligation that they owed to the Wells, the Youngs argued that "a breach of the duty imposed by . . . [Mont. Code Ann.] § 28-1-201, not to damage the property of another, cannot be implied from the court's findings." Id. The Youngs contended that if this finding were implied, it would conflict with the district court's findings and conclusions that "(1) they did not breach the standard of care of a reasonable farm irrigator engaged in flood irrigation, (2) the Wells' trespass and nuisance actions are barred by [Mont. Code Ann.] § 85-7-2212(2), and (3) the flooding . . . was caused by an underground conduit constructed by the BIA." Id.

The Wells argued that the district court did not abuse its discretion under legal or equitable grounds when it imposed a permanent injunction. See id. The Wells did not dispute that a breach of an obligation is a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent injunction under Mont. Code Ann. § 27-19-102, but asserted that § 27-19-102 serves only as "'mere guidelines' to a district court when issuing permanent injunctions pursuant to its equitable powers." Id. They argued that the district court complied with the procedures set forth in the statute when it specifically found that the Youngs breached the obligation imposed by Mont. Code Ann. § 28-1-201that binds everyone by a general duty of care, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another or infringing upon any rights. See id.

The Wells also argued that the Youngs breached the obligation imposed by § 28-1-201 because the Youngs' irrigations practices caused "immediate, irreparable, and substantial harm" to their home. See id. They also asserted that an implied finding exists that the Youngs breached the duty imposed by Mont. Code Ann. § 28-1-201, "as such a finding is consistent with the district court's express findings." Id. at 812.

The court explained that although the parties agreed that a district court must determine that there has been a breach of an obligation by the party sought to be enjoined before a permanent injunction can be issued in accordance with § 27-19-102, they disagreed "over whether the District Court expressly or impliedly found that the Youngs breached the obligation imposed by § 28-1-201 . . . ." Id. Thus, it stated that it had to examine the district court's findings to determine whether it expressly or impliedly determined that the Youngs breached the obligation imposed by § 28-1-201. See id.

Based upon its examination of the district court's findings the court stated that

[c]learly the District Court entered a general finding . . . that the Youngs breached the duty imposed upon them by § 28-201 . . . . In the face of this general finding, however, the District Court also entered specific findings and conclusions that the Youngs: (1) did not trespass, pursuant to § 85-7-2212(2) . . . (2) did not create a nuisance, pursuant to § 27-30-101(3) . . ., and (3) conformed to the applicable standard of care required of them. This leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the District Court's general finding that the Youngs breached the duty imposed by § 28-1-201 . . . conflicts with its more specific findings and conclusions . . . . Hence, we must reject the District Court's general finding that the Youngs breached § 28-1-201 . . . We conclude . . . that the District Court abused its discretion when it imposed a permanent injunction pursuant to § 27-19-102 . . since the District Court entered specific findings and conclusions that the Youngs' irrigation practices were lawful and were not negligently performed.

Id. at 812-13 (citations omitted).

Next, the court considered whether the district court "abused its discretion, as a matter of equity, when it enjoined flood irrigation practices on the Youngs property." Id. at 813. The Youngs contended that because equity follows the law, "a finding of wrongful activity or the breach of obligation is a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent injunction since such a finding is required by § 27-19-102 . . . ." Id. The Wells asserted that imposition of the injunction was appropriate and that "the equities clearly favor them since they will sustain substantial damages to their home if the Youngs' flood irrigation practices, which net the Youngs only nominal revenues, are allowed to continue." Id.

The court explained that it had held on prior occasions that equity follows the law. See id. (citations omitted). It also explained that in those cases "wrongful conduct or the breach of an obligation were expressly identified" before a permanent injunction was imposed. Id. (citations omitted). The court stated that

the District Court . . . entered no specific findings that the Youngs' conduct was unlawful or that they breached an obligation. Rather, the District Court specifically determined that the Youngs' conduct was lawful and that the "most plausible and credible explanation" of the flooding experienced by the Wells resulted from an abandoned BIA ditch. Therefore, based on the particular facts of this case, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion, as a matter of equity, when it permanently enjoined flood irrigation practices on the Youngs' property. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's imposition of a permanent injunction in this case.

Id. at 814.

The dissent disagreed with the majority's view of the appropriateness of injunctive relief. See id. at 814. It stated that "[b]ased upon general equity principles, the deference afforded to district courts with respect to equitable relief and our established precedent, I would hold that the District Court properly enjoined the Youngs from further damaging the Wells' home in order to earn approximately $400 per year." Id.

The case was decided on May 15, 2002; this summary was posted August, 2003