Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Labor

Workers' Compensation Is Exclusive
Remedy for Injured Farmworker

Lynn Cox
National AgLaw Center Research Assistant

An agricultural employee who suffered severe injuries as a result of a vehicle accident that occurred in the course and scope of his employment relationship with a licensed farm labor contractor has brought an action against the farm labor contractor seeking compensation for his injuries. Ruiz v. Cabrera, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). The California Court of Appeals has ruled that the California Farm Labor Contractors Act ("FLCA"), Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1682-1699, did not provide an implied exception to the general rule of workers' compensation exclusivity and that the exclusive remedy provision contained in the California Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA"), Cal. Lab. Code §§ 3600-3605, barred the injured agricultural employee from bringing a tort action against the farm labor contractor. See id. at 321-25. The court also ruled that the provisions of the WCA mandating workers' compensation for farmworkers rendered obsolete the section of the FLCA governing injuries to farmworkers transported in the FLCA licensee's insured vehicles. See id.

Plaintiff, Homero Ruiz, was hired by defendant, Juan Cabrera, doing business as J.C. Contracting. See id. at 321. Cabrera was a farm labor contractor registered as a farm labor contractor pursuant to the FLCA. See id. On September 7, 1997, Cabrera directed another employee, Ofelia Lopez, to transport part of the work crew, including Ruiz, in her van. See id. During the trip, Lopez caused a collision when she failed to obey a stop sign. See id. Three crewmembers were killed and several others, including Ruiz, were injured in the accident. See id.

Ruiz sued Cabrera through his guardian ad litem. See id. HisThe action was consolidated with actions brought by other injured crewmembers and the survivors of the crewmembers killed in the accident. See id. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Cabrera, concluding that "because Ruiz was an employee of Cabrera and was injured in the course of his employment, workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy available to Ruiz." Id. Ruiz appealed the trial court's decision to the California Court of Appeals. See id.

The appeals court explained that § 3602 of the WCA provides that

as a general matter, where the statutory conditions for compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act "concur, the right to recover such compensation is [with enumerated exceptions] . . . the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer, and the fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of, the employee's industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to bring an action at law for damages against the employer."

Id. at 321-22. (quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 3602(a)).

Ruiz argued that the FLCA created an implied exception to the general rule of workers' compensation exclusivity provided under § 3602(a). See id. at 322. Ruiz reasoned as follows:

Sections 1695.7, subdivision (c)(4) provides that an "aggrieved worker" may bring a civil action for violation of "this section;" the section sets forth, as applicable here, the FLCA licensing requirement. Section 1697, subdivision (b), provides that an "employee aggrieved by any violation of this chapter," with stated exceptions, may bring a civil action "for injunctive relief or damages, or both . . . ." By virtue of the use of "worker" and "employee" in these sections, the Legislature must have contemplated an exception to the exclusivity rule of section 3602, . . . otherwise the grant of a private right of action would be meaningless . . . . [Therefore] an employer registered under [the] FLCA is not entitled to the protection of section 3602.

Id.

The court explained that because the primary purpose of the FLCA is to "protect farmworkers from mistreatment at the hands of their employers . . .[,] [i]t is hardly surprising . . . that when the Legislature added a private right of action to enforce FLCA in 1976 . . ., it conferred that right of action upon an 'employee.'" Id. It also explained that it is also not surprising that the Legislature "described the employee as one 'aggrieved by any violation of this chapter . . . .'" It further explained that "[t]he focus of FLCA is the preservation of the financial integrity of the employment relationship by insuring the payment of wages, assuring the availability of work when such work is promised, and prohibiting imposition of unfair charges against employees as a condition of access to work." Id. (citations omitted). It added that "[w]hile it would not be a misuse of language for the Legislature to describe an employee as 'injured' by a violation of these protective provisions, the choice of alternative designation 'aggrieved' more accurately reflects the scope of protections intended by FLCA." Id. (citations omitted).

The court stated that "[i]n light of . . . the language used in sections 1695.7 and 1697, we are unable to conclude that application of the exclusivity provisions of section 3602 would render the provisions of sections 1695.7 and 1697 meaningless or absurd." Id. at 323. "Instead," the court continued, "application of the exclusivity provisions in the present circumstances would harmonize the provisions of [the] FLCA and the Workers' Compensation Act in the manner undertaken by the Supreme Court in the two cases plaintiff cites in his brief on appeal," City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 959 P.2d 752 (1998) and Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990). Id. at 323-24.

In City of Moorpark, the issue was whether Cal. Lab. Code § 132a, which, in relevant part, governs discrimination against workers injured in the course of employment, provides the exclusive remedy when an employer discriminates against a worker who has been injured on the job. See id. at 324 (citation omitted). Section 132a "provides a remedy within the workers' compensation system for such discrimination in the amount of one-half of the injured workers' total compensation award, up to $10,000." Id. In City of Moorpark the court concluded that § 132a did not provide the exclusive remedy for disability discrimination that arose from an on-the-job injury. See id. In doing so, it contrasted § 132a with § 3600 and noted that § 3602 "made the workers' compensation remedy exclusive only for injuries made compensable under section 3600, . . . that is 'personal physical injury or death' 'sustained in and arising out of the course of employment.'" Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, that court determined that an injured worker was permitted to pursue a disability discrimination claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act . . ., even though the disability arose from an on-the-job injury. Id. (citations omitted).

In Shoemaker, the court examined the scope of workers' compensation exclusivity as established in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729 P.3d 743 (1987). See id. In Cole the court ruled that "the exclusivity rule did not bar a civil action against an employer where action taken against an employee fell outside the 'compensation bargain' or, roughly speaking, outside the normal employment relationship." Id. Shoemaker involved a state employee who was harassed by his supervisors and was fired after he complained about his supervisors' complicity in illegal activities by state contractors. See id. In Shoemaker the court stated that "because of the strong and explicit statutory prohibition on retaliation against governmental 'whistleblowers,' the supervisors' conduct fell outside the 'compensation bargain' as defined in Cole." Id. It therefore concluded that "[b]ecause the supervisors' intentional conduct fell outside the compensation bargain, the employee was entitled to seek compensation for his emotional distress injury in a civil action." Id.

In the present case, the court explained that Ruiz did not assert that he suffered injuries that were not compensable in the workers' compensation system, "such as the discrimination suffered in City of Moorpark, nor that his injuries arose from employer conduct outside the 'compensation bargain,' as in Shoemaker." Id. It found that "[i]nstead, he alleges he suffered ordinary (albeit very severe) physical injury while engaged in the course and scope of his employment. We hold that plaintiff's exclusive remedy for such physical injury is workers' compensation." Id.

The case was decided on May 30, 2002; this summary was posted August, 2003