Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Migrant Labor

New York Farmer Subject to Personal
Jurisdiction in Arizona Through Actions
of Texas Farm Labor Contractor

Harrison M. Pittman
Staff Attorney

In an action brought under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1999), and certain provisions of Arizona state law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that J.B. Martin and Sons Farms, Inc. ("Martin Farms"), a farming operation located in New York, was subject to personal jurisdiction in an Arizona federal district court as a result of its relationship with a Texas-based farm labor contractor that recruited migrant workers residing in Arizona for work on its cabbage and squash farms. Ochoa v. J.B. Martin and Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2002).

Ramey Farms, Inc. ("Ramey") is a farm labor contractor based in Texas. Id. at 1186. Ramey contracted with Martin Farms to provide workers for the1997 harvest. Id. Martin Farms later requested that Ramey provide a work crew to weed Martin Farm's fields in the summer of 1997. Id. Ramey recruited the summer work crew from Texas. Id. Because Martin Farms was not satisfied with the quality of work provided by the summer work crew, it instructed Ramey to provide different farmworkers for the1997 harvest. Id. Ramey communicated to Martin Farms that it would recruit the new fall work crew from San Luis, Arizona. Id. Upon receiving notification from Martin Farms that the crops were ready to harvest, Ramey transported the Arizona resident workers to Martin Farms' labor camp. Id. at 1187.

The farmworkers filed suit in district court alleging that Martin Farms provided substandard housing, breached the parties' contract by not compensating the workers the amount owed, and failed to provide some of the workers with transportation for the journey back to Arizona when the work was finished. Id. Ramey is not a defendant in this action. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Martin Farms, and the plaintiffs appealed. Id.

The only issue before the Ninth Circuit was "whether migrant farmworkers, recruited by a labor contractor in one state to work on a farm in another state, can assert personal jurisdiction in the state of their residence over a non-resident farm employer." Id. This was a matter of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, although other courts had previously confronted this issue. Id. (citing and discussing Villalobos v. North Carolina Growers Ass'n, 42 F. Supp.2d 131 (D.P.R. 1999), Hyppolite v. Gorday, 115 Lab.Cas. ¶ 35,346 (S.D. Fla. 1996), Astorga v. Connleaf, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 93 (W.D. Tex. 1996), and Castillo v. Case Farms of Ohio, Inc., 96 F. Supp.2d 578 (W.D. Tex. 1999)).

The Ninth Circuit first noted that Arizona law governed whether plaintiffs could assert personal jurisdiction over Martin Farms. Id. at 1188 (citing Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.1989)). The Arizona long-arm statute allows "the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the due process clause of the United States Constitution." Id. (citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(e)(2)). Due process requires that a defendant have "minimum contacts" with the forum state "‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

The Ninth Circuit posited that if Ramey acted as an agent of Martin Farms when it recruited the Arizona farm workers (and managed them while working in New York), then its recruiting activities would "suffice to provide specific jurisdiction over Martin Farms" under Arizona law. Id. at 1189. The court further noted that Arizona law allowed a finding in which Ramey could be both an independent contractor and an agent of Martin Farms. Id. (citing Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 198 Ariz. 367 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc)). The court pointed out that there are eight factors to consider in order to determine whether an individual is an independent contractor or employee. Id. (citing Santiago v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 164 Ariz. 505 (Ariz.1990)). The eight part test in Santiago focuses on (1) the extent and control over the work and the degree of supervision, (2) the distinct nature of the workers' business, (3) the occupation's required specialization, (4) the provider of materials and the place of work, (5) the duration of employment, (6) the method of payment, (7) the relationship of work done to the regular business of the employer, and (8) the belief of the parties. Id.

The Ninth Circuit concluded, based on Wiggs and the eight part test in Santiago, that Ramey was an agent of Martin Farms when it recruited the Arizona farm workers. Id. (citing Theo. H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of the Marshall Islands, 174 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that "In determining the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts, it is not only defendant's activities in the forum, but also actions relevant to the transaction by an agent on defendant's behalf, which support personal jurisdiction.") (internal quotation marks omitted)). Summarizing its analysis of the Santiago test the court remarked, "Martin Farms issued instructions and expected those instructions to be followed; Martin Farms controlled the work to be done and provided the tools, equipment, and housing; Ramey lacked highly specialized skills; the relationship between Ramey and Martin Farms was ongoing; and Ramey's recruiting and management tasks were not ancillary to the central concerns of Martin Farms' business." Id. Thus, Ramey's recruiting and managing efforts were sufficient to allow specific jurisdiction over Martin Farms. Id. at 1189-1190.

In the final part of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Martin Farms did not violate the demands of due process. Id. at 1192. Recognizing that Martin Farms would bear an added cost if the matter was litigated in Arizona, the court stated that the burden on the defendant should be considered in light of the burden on the plaintiff. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). Highlighting the fact that the plaintiffs in this case were "migrant workers of very limited means," the court concluded that the plaintiffs' burden of litigating in New York substantially outweighed the defendants' burden of litigating in Arizona. Id. It was also important that critical evidence such as payroll records, bank account receipts, and videotapes of the New York housing conditions could easily be mailed to Arizona. Id. at 1193.

In addition, the court recognized that even though "more claims arise out of activities that occurred in New York, many of the witnesses needed to investigate and substantiate these claims are Arizona residents." Id. The court also discussed the significant interest that Arizona has in protecting its residents from injury by out-of-state employers. Id. The court noted that New York's interest in the litigation was lessened because the alleged harm was committed against Arizona residents by New York residents. Id.

This case summary was prepared June, 2002.