Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Agriculture and Urbanization

Idaho Courts Have Personal Jurisdiction
over Out-of-State Corporation

Gaby R. Jabbour
National AgLaw Center Research Assistant

In an action brought by a resident of the State of Idaho against a Washington farming operation alleging that her respiratory difficulties were caused by the farming operation's grass burning activities, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the alleged tortious conduct on the part of the Washington farming operation within the state of Idaho was sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Idaho. McAnally v. Bonjac, Inc., 50 P.3d 983, 983 (Idaho 2002).

On September 18, 1995, Kelly McAnally, appellant, "began having difficulty breathing from a great deal of smoke that was in the air from grass-field burning in Idaho and Washington" and "suffered a 'near respiratory collapse' when she arrived at [Kootenai Medical Center] and was admitted to the emergency room." Id. at 984. She stayed in the hospital for several days and "continue[d] to have respiratory problems and has been hospitalized several times since September 18, 1995." Id. Her physicians attributed her respiratory difficulties to the smoke inhaled on September 18, 1995. See id. On September 17, 1997, McAnally and her husband "sued twenty-one Idaho and Washington farmers who had burned fields on September 18, 1995, as well as the Intermountain Grass Growers' Association (IGCA), an organization that advises farmers on the times when field burning is permissible." Id.

Bonjac, Inc. (Bonjac), a Washington farming corporation, "was named as a defendant because McAnally believed its grass-burning activities had contributed to her injuries." Id. at 985. On May 18, 2000, Bonjac moved for summary judgment alleging "a lack of personal jurisdiction; absence of negligence, trespass, nuisance, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law; and preclusion of nuisance claims by the Idaho Right to Farm Act." Id.

The district court granted Bonjac's motion for summary judgment and determined that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Bonjac. See id. The McAnallys appealed the district court's decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. See id.

The Supreme Court stated that "[f]or an Idaho court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, 'two criteria must be met; the act giving rise to the cause of action must fall within the scope of our long-arm statute and the constitutional standards of due process must be met.'" Id. at 986 (quoting St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. State of Washington, 852 P.2d 491, 494 (Idaho 1993)). The court also stated that "[t]he commission of a tort within the state is considered sufficient contact 'to invoke the tortious act language of I.C. § 5-514(b).'" It added that § 5-514(b) "is designed to provide a forum for Idaho residents, [and] is remedial legislation of the most fundamental nature and should be liberally construed." Id. (citation omitted).

The court stated that "[t]aking into account the purpose of the long-arm statute and reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the McAnallys, we find that personal jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 5-514(b) exists." Id. It reversed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment and "remande[d] the case to the district court for consideration based on . . . [its] finding that Idaho courts have personal jurisdiction over Bonjac." Id.

The case was decided on July 2, 2002; this summary was posted July, 2003