Summary of a Recent
Judicial
Development in
Environmental Law
State Law and Regulations Not
Preempted by Swampbuster
Gaby R. JabbourNational AgLaw Center Research Assistant
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California has ruled that because the "Swampbuster" provisions contained in Title XII of the Food Security Act (FSA) of 1985, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-24, were enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, they do not preempt the laws or regulations of an unconsenting state and its political subdivisions. Citizens for Honesty and Integrity in Regional Planning v. County of San Diego, No. 02 CV 1855, 2003 WL 1900717 (S.D. Cal., Apr. 15, 2003). The court also ruled that even if legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause could preempt the laws or regulations of an unconsenting state, there was no clear and manifest evidence that Congress intended for the Swampbuster provisions to preempt state and local authority to regulate wetlands. See id. at *5.
Karl A. Turecek, one of the plaintiffs, was the managing general partner of Jacumba Valley Ranch Ltd. Partnership, an entity that owned and farmed land located in San Diego County, California. See id. at *1. He filed a specific plan and applied for a major use permit with the county in order to develop his property. See id.
The County of San Diego, defendant, issued an ordinance known as the Resource Protection Ordinance (RPO), which defined "wetland" more broadly than the Swampbuster definition of "wetland." See id. The Swampbuster provisions defined wetland as "any property consisting of: (1) hydric soils, (2) wetland hydrology, and (3) hydrophytic vegetation." Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(18)). In contrast, the RPO defined a "wetland" as "any property containing: (1) hydric soils, (2) wetland hydrology, or (3) hydrophytic vegetation." Id. (citing RPO Art. II, ¶ 16).
In September, 1994, the County's Department of Planning and Land Use (DPLU) informed Turecek of its intention to apply the RPO definition to his property. See id. (citations omitted). Turecek urged the County to apply the Swampbuster definition for "wetland," "and in March 1995, he received a letter from the DPLU stating that if 'the land under tillage is not wetland, under federal definitions, then the [DPLU] will recommend that the appropriate hearing bodies also accept that conclusion.'" Id. (citation omitted). The County did not attempt to enforce the RPO against Turecek while his application for a major use permit was pending for more than eight years. See id. On January 15, 2003, Turecek's application was denied. See id.
On September 17, 2002, Turecek and the other plaintiff, Citizens for Honesty and Integrity in Regional Planning (CHIRP), a grassroots community group that was organized for the purpose of representing the interests of the public, filed an action in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the RPO definition of "wetland" was preempted by the Swampbuster definition. See id. On October 28, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss "pursuant to subsections (b)(1) and (b)(6) of FRCP 12," maintaining that a dismissal "was warranted because: (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing; (2) the matter was not ripe for adjudication; and (3) the Swampbuster provisions do not preempt the RPO." Id.
On December 20, 2002, the court determined that CHIRP lacked standing and dismissed its claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. (citation omitted). The court also determined that Turecek had standing and that the matter was ripe for adjudication, but that the ultimate question of preemption ought to be handled in the context of a summary judgment motion rather than a motion to dismiss. See id. The court invited the parties to file cross-motions for summary judgments, and Turecek and the County of San Diego presented their oral arguments on the cross-motions on April 14, 2003. See id. at *2.
The court first noted that the powers upon which Congress relied to adopt the Swampbuster provisions were the spending powers of Article I of the Constitution. See id. at *3 (citing United States v. Dierckerman, 201 F.3d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 2000)). It also stated that "even though Congress may lack the authority to regulate directly a strictly intrastate wetland, the incentive provided by the FSA is a valid exercise of the spending power." Id.
The court explained that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly characterized Spending Clause legislation as much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the recipients agree to comply with federally imposed conditions." Id. at *4 (citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) and quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S 1, 17 (1981)). It added that in this case, the recipient of the federal funds was a private individual, Turecek, and that neither the State of California nor its political subdivision, the County of San Diego, received funding under the Swampbuster provisions. See id. Thus, neither the State nor the County were parties to the contract between Turecek and the federal government. See id. The court concluded that
[i]n other words, neither the State nor the County were parties to the "contract" between Turecek and the federal government. Thus, though Turecek is bound to the terms of Swampbuster, the State and County are not. The Constitution can condone no other conclusion, for if a private citizen could bind unconsenting States to the terms of legislation enacted under the Spending Clause, then the concept of federalism would be a dead letter. It follows, therefore, that-unlike Commerce Clause legislation- a law enacted under the Spending Clause must lack preemptive effect over the policy choices of unconsenting States.
Id.
The court stated that even if legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause could preempt the laws and regulations of an unconsenting state, there was no "clear and manifest" evidence that Congress intended for Swampbuster to preempt state and local authority to regulate wetlands. See id. at *5. It explained that there were three types of federal preemption: express, conflict preemption, and field preemption." Id. at *2. Express preemption exists when Congress "states expressly, within the federal statute, its intention to preempt state law." Id. Conflict preemption "is implied whenever compliance with both the federal and state law is physically impossible or when the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. (citation omitted). Field preemption exists whenever "federal regulation is "'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.'" Id. (citation omitted).
With respect to express preemption, the court determined that the Swampbuster provisions did not contain language of express preemption, that the RPO definition of wetland was not inconsistent with the federal definition, and that there was explicit evidence in the legislative history that Congress did not intend for regulations enacted pursuant to the Swampbuster provisions to preempt state law. See id. at *5 (citations omitted). With respect to conflict preemption, the court considered Turecek's contentions that "the RPO definition of 'wetland' is implicitly preempted under the doctrine of conflict preemption" because the RPO "stands as an obstacle to the purpose Congress sought to achieve through its agricultural statutes and reguations." Id. at *6 (citation omitted). The court rejected this argument, stating that
[a]s Congress noted when it enacted the Swampbuster provisions, "in the present time of surplus agricultural production there is certainly no need for the conversion of more resources into agricultural production especially when . . . wetland resources have such an inherent value . . . ." Moreover, in the unlikely event that state environmental regulations come to pose a threat to the nation's food supply, Congress is free to respond by enacting a law that expressly preempts those regulations.
Id. (citations omitted).
The court also stated that the goal in enacting the Swampbuster provisions "was merely to deny federal agricultural subsidies to individuals or entities who choose to farm wetlands" and not to halt the conversion of the nation's wetlands or to restore wetlands already altered. See id. at *6. It added that "efforts to completely halt the conversion of wetlands must be undertaken by state and local governments, if at all." Id.
The court concluded that "even if Spending Clause legislation could have preemptive force over the laws or regulations of an unconsenting state and its political subdivisions, there is no clear and manifest evidence that Congress intended (explicitly or implicitly) for Swampbuster to supplant state and local authority to regulate wetlands." Id. It denied Turecek's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. See id.
The case was decided on April 14, 2003; this summary was posted May, 2003