Summary of a Recent
Judicial
Development in
Food Safety
Non-Profit Organization Lacks Standing
to Challenge
Classification and
Use of Downed Animals
Patricia FarneseNational AgLaw Center Graduate Fellow
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has dismissed an action in which the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that would require the USDA to classify all downed animals as "adulterated" pursuant to federal law and an injunction that would prevent the use of these animals for human consumption. Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Baur, 212 F.Supp.2d 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The court dismissed this action because the plaintiffs lacked standing. See id. at 283-85.
In 1998, Farm Sanctuary, Inc. ("Farm Sanctuary"), a non-profit organization that advocates for the humane treatment of animals, and Michael Baur ("Baur"), filed a petition with the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") seeking to alter the current USDA classification of downed animals. See id. at 281. They contended that downed animals, ones that cannot walk without assistance, should qualify as "adulterated" under 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-396, and should not be used for human consumption. See id. They also argued that the brief inspection of downed cattle before slaughter increased the likelihood that the food supply would be exposed to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly called "mad cow disease," as BSE is one of the illnesses that causes animals to collapse. See id. The petition further stated that "downed animals are often neglected and taken to slaughterhouses in an inhumane manner." Id. at 282 (citing plaintiff's Complaint ¶13).
The USDA denied the petition on the basis that the plaintiffs relied on the definition of "adulterated" contained in the Federal Meat Inspection Act ("FMIA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695, not the definition contained in the FFDCA. See id.
The plaintiffs subsequently brought the present action, and the USDA filed a motion to have it dismissed for lack of standing. See id. The USDA argued that the plaintiffs failed to identify an actionable claim because the USDA has no authority to interpret or enforce the FFDCA. See id. The USDA further argued that its decision to deny the petition was not made arbitrarily or capriciously. See id. Because the district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, they did not address any other issues raised by the USDA. See id.
The court stated that to have standing to sue the federal government, a plaintiff must establish: "1) that is [sic] has suffered an injury in fact; 2) that the government's action caused that injury; and 3) that the remedy sought can redress the injury." See id. The court also stated that "the injury alleged must be, for example, distinct and palpable, and not abstract or conjectural or hypothetical." Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, (1984)). Furthermore, the court employed the "zone of interests" test and required the plaintiffs to show that the law in question was intended to protect the plaintiff against the injury alleged. See id.
Although the court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that the imminent threat of injury is sufficient to grant standing, it did not recognize that Baur, as a meat-eater, faced an imminent threat of injury as a result of consuming BSE contaminated meat. See id. at 283-84. Instead, it held "Baur's harm is more appropriately classified as hypothetical rather than imminent" because there is no evidence of BSE in the United States and, if it did arrive in the United States, it is highly unlikely that it would go undetected and later be consumed by Baur. Id. at 283. The court concluded that the "mere fact that the plaintiffs want the federal government to pursue a particular regulatory action does not satisfy the standing requirement . . . The USDA has not inflicted a cognizable injury on Baur; his proper recourse is to the legislative branch, not the judicial branch." Id.
The court next examined whether Farm Sanctuary had standing. See id. at 284. Farm Sanctuary argued that its members who inspect slaughterhouses suffered mental injury after observing the treatment of cattle. See id. The USDA did not dispute the fact that the Farm Sanctuary's members were injured; instead, they argued that the plaintiffs' injuries were outside the zone of interest protected by the FMIA. See id. The court agreed and held that "[t]he fact that Farm Sanctuary is acting on behalf of the common good does not mean that its injury is the harm that Congress intended to protect under the statute." Id. In addition, the court stated that "[i]f Farm Sanctuary's claim was held to be within the zone of interests protected by the FMIA, then any plaintiff claiming to sue in the public interest would have standing, thus depriving the zone of interests test of its meaning." Id. at 285. The court concluded by stating that the purpose of the FMIA is to protect the food supply and not to regulate the humane treatment of animals. See id.
The case was decided on July 30, 2002; this summary was prepared in October, 2002.