Summary of a Recent
Judicial Development in
Wildlife

Georgia Farmer Not Allowed to Sell Wild
Alligators Inhabiting His Farm Pond

Harrison M. Pittman
Staff Attorney

The Georgia Court of Appeals in Wright v. Department of Natural Resources, 562 S.E.2d 515 (Ga.App.2002) has affirmed a trial court decision that a Georgia alligator farmer cannot sell alligators living in a fenced-in pond on the farmer’s land. The court of appeals ruled that the farmer did not have a property interest in the alligators to substantiate a viable takings claim; that even if the takings claim was viable, it was nevertheless barred by a four-year statute of limitations, and that the farmer was precluded by statute from asserting a nuisance claim against the Department of Natural Resources for the state of Georgia (DNR). Id.

Winston Wright fenced in part of a pond on his land in 1963 in order to contain a small number of “wild” alligators dwelling in the pond. Id. at 516. Nearly two decades later, Wright attempted to create an alligator farm by applying for a license from the DNR. Id. His intention was to use the alligators he had confined, as well as their offspring, as “brood stock.” Id. The DNR denied his application because it was necessary for his “brood stock to be obtained from a legal source, such as another alligator farmer, and not from the wildlife population of Georgia.” Id.

Wright later purchased eight alligators from another alligator farmer and subsequently received an alligator farming license, with the understanding that the alligators confined in 1963 would not be a part of his alligator farm operation, and that the alligator populations would be separately maintained. Id. at 516-17. After a period of time, however, the two populations became intermingled. Id. at 517. Wright’s license was renewed for a final time in 1991 on the condition that the alligators, now intermingled, would be recaptured and properly separated. Id. Wright failed to do this, and the DNR has not allowed him to collect alligator eggs since that time. Id. The DNR would not allow Wright to sell his alligators, and he refused to sell only the licensed alligators. Id.

Wright filed suit against the DNR alleging that the DNR owed him “just and adequate compensation for the taking of the alligators.” Id. He also argued that if the State did, in fact, own the alligators and did not allow him to remove them from his property by selling them, then the alligators qualified as a nuisance on his property. Id. at 518. The court of appeals dismissed both of these arguments.

With respect to the first argument, the court ruled that Wright had no property interest in the alligators under Georgia law, thereby dissolving his takings claim. Id. He lacked a property interest because “he did not abide by the law at the outset in acquiring the alligators, and because the law in effect at the time he applied for a license placed ownership of wildlife in the State of Georgia . . . .” Id. The court also ruled that even under the assumption that Wright did have a property interest in the alligators, he still would have been barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations from making a takings claim. Id. Finally, the court rejected Wright’s nuisance argument on the ground that the DNR was immune from suit under OCGA § 27-1-3(b), which stated that the DNR was “immune from suit and shall not be liable for any damage to life, person, or property caused directly or indirectly by any wildlife.” Id.

This case summary was prepared June, 2002.